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INTRODUCTION
Family structures have changed over the past half century, and the
paradigmatic marital family with children now constitutes less than one-half
of all households. While some decry the move away from marriage and
others celebrate the increase in family diversity, the best sociological work
* June Carbone is the Robina Chair of Law, Science, and Technology at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School. Naomi Cahn is the Harold H. Greene Professor of Law,
George Washington University Law School. Our thanks to Melanie Jacobs for inviting us to
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indicates that the changes reflect growing inequality and class divisions as
much, if not more than, societal changes. In the face of these increasing
class divisions, a vigorous debate asks how (and whether) the law should
respond to these changes. At the core of this debate is a growing class-based
disconnect between the law and family norms.' The elite, which, for pur-
poses of this Article, constitutes the roughly one-third of the country who
graduate from college and/or enjoy substantial incomes, has become, if any-
thing, more likely to raise their children in committed two-parent families.
The marginalized bottom third has largely given up on marriage, raising
children in the context of single-parent families and contingent, rather than
committed, relationships with a second adult. The middle is in flux, as it
remains more likely to marry than the bottom, more likely to divorce than
the top, and in the midst of an unresolved struggle to redefine the new terms
for multiple parents, stepparents, and intimate partners.
In assessing the relationship between family law and class, the iconic
description comes from Jacobus tenBroek. In the early sixties, he argued
that family law is implemented through "a dual system," 2 with two parts that
differ in substance, purpose, and procedure.3 One system focused on private
arrangements and supported the families of those who were economically
self-sufficient.4 TenBroek maintained, however, that a parallel second sys-
tem existed, one imposed on those who sought public assistance.5 In this
second system: (1) the state, not individual family members, controls the
1. We argue in our forthcoming book, NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, MARRIAGE
MARKETS: WHAT Is REALLY HAPPENING TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY (forthcoming 2014), that
the interaction between law and behavior is a two-way street. That is, the law influences
behavior and changing behavior in turn influences the law. In particular, judicial decisions,
as they try to make sense of changing behavior and of the application of the law to new cir-
cumstances, often ratify and systematize new norms. In this Article, we focus on how the
courts choose which behavioral changes contribute to new legal understandings and which
are marginalized, penalized, or ignored.
2. See generally Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its
Origin, Development, and Present Status (pts. 1-I11), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964), 16 STAN.
L. REV. 900 (1964), 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965) [hereinafter tenBroek Parts I-I11].
3. tenBroek wrote that:
we have two systems of family law in California: different in origin, different in
history, different in substantive provisions, different in administration, different in
orientation and outlook. One is public, the other private. One deals with expendi-
ture and conservation of public funds and is heavily political and measurably pe-
nal. The other deals with the distribution of family funds, focuses on the rights and
responsibilities of family members, and is civil, nonpolitical, and less penal. One is
for underprivileged and deprived families; the other for the more comfortable and
fortunate.
Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and
Present Status (pt. 1), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 257-58 (1964).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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litigation and the settlements; (2) the law imposed may not necessarily re-
flect the community norms or the parties' understanding of the terms of
their own relationships; and (3) the purpose of the litigation is to protect the
public fisc and reaffirm mainstream norms, whether or not the results are in
the interests of the parties to the litigation.6
TenBroek's analysis of the role of law for the majority rested on an
analysis of the relationship between the formal law on the books and the
ability of litigants to control the terms of their disputes.7 In a later piece,
Bob Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser examined the mechanisms that under-
lie the private bargains in tenBroek's first system, where the sophisticated
and those with access to lawyers negotiate "in the shadow of the law." 8 This
private ordering tends to produce public pronouncements-and judicial
opinions-that reaffirm mainstream principles while allowing couples the
opportunity to provide for alternative arrangements without public scrutiny.'
The law provides the default rules, and these couples choose whether to
litigate, settle, or stay away from court with an eye on how they expect the
court to rule in the event of a final judicial determination. If the couple
agrees, they may affect settlements that differ from what the law might oth-
erwise proscribe; if they disagree with each other, the default legal terms in
the background affect each partner's respective bargaining power."
Finally, Carl Schneider, in assessing the overall effect of public pro-
nouncements and private bargains, argued that the "channelling function" in
family law was critical in assessing the law's impact.'2 He explored the role
of law in reinforcing shared notions of appropriate behavior. 3 He main-
tained that the role of family law is an intermediate one between the public
mandates of criminal law and the deference to private ordering of contract
law. 4 Family law thus articulates and reinforces mainstream norms, con-
6. See Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development, and Present Status (pt. III), 17 STAN. L. REV. 614, 675-82 (1965).
7. See generally tenBroek Parts 1-Ill, supra note 2.
8. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
9. See id. at 950-52; see also June Carbone, Autonomy to Choose What Constitutes
Family: Oxymoron or Basic Right?, in 1 AUTONOMY IN THE LAW 1I (Mortimer Sellers ed.,
2007) (examining the role of law in articulating public norms).
10. See Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 8, at 968.
11. See id. at 964-66, 968 (explaining that parents may privately trade custody for
support in ways that the legal system may not approve).
12. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 495,496 (1992).
13. Id. at 498.
14. Id. at 497, 504 (describing the channelling function of family law as a means for
promoting social institutions that does not primarily use legal coercion); cf Melissa Murray,
Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2012) (examining the relationship between
the crime of seduction and the role of marriage as part of a system of sexual discipline).
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tributing to the redefinition of institutions such as marriage and
parenthood.15 In Schneider's terms, both the first system, which creates
spaces for the private bargains of the powerful, and the second system,
which stigmatizes the alternative arrangements of the powerless, serve to
reinforce shared understandings in society as a whole.
The tenBroekian analysis of the dual system remains foundational to
our understanding of the legal regulation of the family. 6 Within tenBroek's
analysis, Schneider, Mnookin, and Komhauser describe the perpetuation of
a mainstream "first system." This system combines public pronouncements
that reinforce a remade model of marriage that influences the private bar-
gains of the elite. 7 At the same time, state-initiated actions to determine
paternity and impose support as a condition of the receipt of public benefits
15. Schneider, however, was maddeningly elusive on the subject of how norms
change over time. See Schneider, supra note 12, at 518-19. For other influential perspectives
on the relationship between the evolution of the law and the evolution of the family, see
JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 2 (2011) ("Family law follows family life."); LINDA C.
MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 4
(2006) (discussing the government's formative role); MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE
STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA'S POLITICAL IDEALS 14-15 (2010) (discussing
different theories of how the state affects families); Clare Huntington, Staging the Family, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 592 (2013) (labeling the process of "drawing on dominant performances
to shape legal categories-'performative family law"').
16. See, e.g., CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1; Shannon Bettis Nakabayashi, Com-
ment, A "Dual System" of Family Law Revisited: Current Inequities in California's Child
Support Law, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 593, 594 (2001). These divisions between the family law of
rich and poor, private and public, voluntary and involuntary family associations have been
the subject of extensive commentary. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Family History: Inside and
Out, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1003 (2013); Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family
Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229, 238-50 (2000); Naomi R. Cahn, Children's Interests in a Fa-
milial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189, 1211 (1999);
Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 118 & n.22 (2013);
Deborah Harris, Child Support for Welfare Families: Family Policy Trapped in Its Own
Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 619, 621-29 (1988); Leslie Joan Harris, The
Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L.
REV. 61 1, 612-14 (2009) [hereinafter Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage]; Jill Elaine
Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations,
90 GEO. L.J. 299, 357-84 (2002); Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Sub-
ordinating the Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1029, 1043-44 (2007); Amy E. Hirsch, Income Deeming in the AFDC Program:
Using Dual Track Family Law to Make Poor Women Poorer, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 713, 715-16 (1988).
17. See, e.g., Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 8, at 963 ("This ability to compare
different packages has obvious implications for private bargaining, at least when the couple
has sufficient economic resources. Sophisticated parties and their lawyers will attempt to
seek out circumstances in which a different characterization, because of tax effects or differ-
ences in risk or time preferences of the parties, can make both spouses better off.").
1188 2013:1185
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continue to penalize the families that fail to live up to the terms of the new
model.' 8
Left out of these decade-old descriptions of how the law interacts with
family structure, however, is the emergence of a third group, a group that is
in the process of developing what this Article articulates as the "third sys-
tem" of family law. This group differs from the first group in that: (1) re-
gardless of whether it shares the same norms as more elite groups about
marriage and parenthood, it sees itself as unable to "buy into" those norms;' 9
(2) existing law may not necessarily recognize or affirm the understood
terms underlying these family relationships; and (3) members of the group
may not necessarily have access to counsel or the sophistication to effect
private bargains that secure legal recognition of terms to which they would
otherwise agree. At the same time, this group, unlike the marginalized in
tenBroek's second system, are not necessarily receiving public support and
are therefore not subject to state-initiated actions. Their families (and often
their bargains) operate in the "shadows" of the law, neither receiving offi-
cial ratification nor being subject to explicit disapproval. These families
achieve agency in family affairs primarily by staying out of court. They
therefore do not fit neatly into either tenBroek's privileged group, which
enjoys legal ratification of its family arrangements, or tenBroek's marginal-
ized second group, which is often involuntarily subject to state interven-
tion. °
18. See, e.g., Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage, supra note 16, at 614, 620.
19. In Family Classes, we argue that the new "first system" of family law has rede-
fined the terms of marriage to emphasize interdependence and shared parenting. This re-
definition of marriage as an institution operates at a societal level and influences the percep-
tion of what marriage means for the country as a whole. All of the groups we describe see
marriage in roughly the same terms and identify readiness for and willingness to marry in
terms of participation in the redefined institution. These groups then vary significantly in
their perception of the ability to meet the terms of marriage. Those who do not marry and
those who do, thus, agree on the definition of what marriage is and what it requires. They
often also agree on the desirability of marriage for those who have what it takes to make it
work. Where they disagree most profoundly is whether marriage, in accordance with these
shared definitions, is accessible to them and whether it is appropriate given their assessment
of their imperfect, existing relationships. They also disagree fundamentally on whether they
have an obligation to put themselves in a position to marry. The upper third of the country
believes that it is necessary to finish college, hold a job, and be respectful of a partner in
order to marry and that they should not have children until they are in position to do so in the
context of a committed partnership. The bottom third and increasing parts of the middle do
not believe that they will ever finish college, hold a reliable and satisfying job, or find a
partner they trust and that they have no obligation to do so before having children. The dif-
fering norms of the two groups, therefore, are not so much about marriage or about its desir-
ability, but about whether they have an obligation to position themselves to be able to enter
the institution on its new terms.
20. See tenBroek, supra note 3, at 257-58; cf. Murray, supra note 14 (exploring the
significance of practices outside of existing laws); NAOMI CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP:
1189
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This Article explores the contours of this third system. First, it ex-
plains the increased class divide in family life. TenBroek's dual system dis-
tinguished between two-parent married families, which at the time de-
scribed the vast majority of all American families, and marginalized single
parents, who tended to be overwhelmingly poor and disproportionately Af-
rican-American or Hispanic. 21 In today's system, married two-parent fami-
lies have become a marker of privilege, characterizing a disproportionately
better-educated and wealthier upper third of the country. The middle group
of families is not only more likely than the marginalized group to get mar-
ried but also more likely than the elite group to divorce, remarry, and cohab-
it;22 their nonmarital birth rate, while increasing, remains lower than that of
the marginalized group.
Second, the Article analyzes how the law of marriage, parenthood, and
support contributes to three (rather than two) distinct family systems. The
first system, which governs the families of the upper third, promotes inter-
dependent finances and shared parenting as the new marital ideal. It
acknowledges the relative equality 24 of men and women, encourages mar-
CONSTRUCTING DONOR-CONCEIVED FAMILIES (2013) (exploring the significance of practices
outside of existing laws).
21. The poverty rate for blacks in 1959 was over 50%, while it was less than 20%
for whites. See Dylan Matthews, Poverty in the 50 Years Since 'The Other America,'
WONKBLOG (July 11, 2012, 9:48 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/11/poverty-in-the-50-years-
since-the-other-america-in-five-charts/. The Census Bureau only began to differentiate His-
panics from whites in the early 1970s. Id. Race also affected the number of children living in
two-parent families. See Social Indicators of Marital Health & Well-Being, ST. OUR UNIONS
2011, http://www.stateofourunions.org/201 I/social-indicators.php (last visited Oct. 24,
2013).
22. See Adam Isen & Betsey Stevenson, Women's Education and Family Behavior:
Trends in Marriage, Divorce, and Fertility, in DEMOGRAPHY AND THE ECONOMY 107, 110-11
(John B. Shoven ed., 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8408. Others have
begun to discuss the parameters of this middle group that not only does not, and cannot,
adhere to the norms of the elite, but is also very different from the marginalized. See, e.g.,
JOAN C. WILLIAMS, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW & HEATHER BOUSHEY, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, THE THREE FACES OF WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT: THE POOR, THE PROFESSIONALS,
AND THE MISSING MIDDLE (2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2010/01/pdf/threefaces.pdf. We are among the first to identify this
group within the family law system.
23. See KAY HYMOWITZ ET AL., KNOT YET: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DELAYED
MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 8 figs.IlA, 1iB & IIC (2013), available at
http://nationalmarriageproject.org/wp-contentluploads/2013/03/KnotYet-FinalForWeb.pdf.
24. Equal employment laws and constitutional jurisprudence establish women's
formal equality with men, although the reality is that women continue to earn less than men,
even accounting for all other factors, sex differences continue to affect women's full partici-
pation in the economy, and ideologies perpetuate gendered behaviors. See CAHN &
CARBONE, supra note 1. Nonetheless, the new system dismantles the notion of dependent
homemakers and-"head of family" breadwinners, both legally and practically, insisting in-
1190 2013:1185
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riage between dual earners, and insists on the continued participation of
both parents in childrearing following a breakup. At the same time, interde-
pendent finances have become a bad deal for custodial parents with unrelia-
ble partners; as one young mother put it, "'Calvin [her child's father]
mean[s] one less granola bar for the two of us."'' 25
Parenthood for families outside of the elite is characterized by contin-
gent relationships in which a primary custodial parent often serves as a
gatekeeper, conditioning access to the child on cooperative and supportive
behavior from the other parent. While family law emphasizes the im-
portance of the continuing involvement of both parents and shared custody
orders are effectively available for the asking in most jurisdictions, empiri-
cal work shows that the likelihood of shared custody correlates strongly
with income. 26 For those in the first system, the marital presumption ensures
automatic recognition of husbands' paternity, and divorce decrees systemat-
ically address custody in providing for children born into the marriage. For
those in the third system, the state initiates actions to establish paternity and
secure support, but typically does little to facilitate the non-custodial par-
ents' involvement with the child. For those in between, paternity, custody,
and support depend on cooperation between the parents. These parents, who
do typically share some involvement with their children, are developing
arrangements often at odds with the formal law, through agreements that
often fail to receive explicit recognition or support.
We conclude that it is time to recognize that family diversity is not
merely the product of different choices, but is a reflection of a system that
simultaneously reinforces the foundation of elite intimate bargains, rejects
those of the marginalized, and is unwilling to acknowledge the emerging
norms of the center. At the core of what this Article identifies as the triple
system of family law is women's greater autonomy, if not necessarily socie-
tal equality. At the top, the first system serves to lock in new terms that not
only acknowledge women's greater independence but also redefine mar-
riage to offer greater protection for elite men. At the bottom, tenBroek's
second system continues, as it always has, to reject women's greater auton-
omy without in fact assisting low-income men in realizing better terms for
family relationships.27 In the middle, the largely invisible fight is one to set
stead on the relative equality that comes from continued economic independence within an
interdependent, but not necessarily permanent, partnership. Id.
25. HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN AND THE RISE OF WOMEN 2 (2012).
26. PATRICIA BROWN & STEVEN T. COOK, CHILDREN'S PLACEMENT ARRANGEMENTS
IN DIVORCE AND PATERNITY CASES IN WISCONSIN 2 (rev. ed. 2012), available at
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/childsup/cspolicy/pdfs/2009-1 I/Task4ACS_09-
I1 _Finalrevi20l2.pdf.
27. See, e.g., KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN:
FATHERHOOD IN THE INNER CITY (2013); Laurie S. Kohn, Engaging Men as Fathers: The
1191
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the terms for families where women are increasingly the more reliable
breadwinners and homemakers 2 without the ability to lock in understand-
ings that would reflect their greater assumption of family responsibilities.
Development of the laws in this third system accordingly requires recogni-
tion that the critical choice is whether to accept women's greater authority
within the family or accelerate the move away from committed relationships
altogether.
I. THE SYSTEMS
A. Class
For purposes of the analysis in this Article, class is a social construct,
often-but not always-correlated with income. It is a term designed to
make more visible the way that society creates expectations about behavior
and/or channels societal resources, such as wealth and income, parental time
and attention, and human capital acquisition.29 This Article identifies three
different classes that interact in substantially different ways with family
law.3" The elite are the group of college graduates who stand apart from
non-graduates in income and family formation practices. This group consti-
tutes no more than a third of today's young adults and a smaller percentage
of the adult population as a whole.3
The second group is the "middle" of the American population, includ-
ing those who graduated from high school, but not college, and those who,
while perhaps struggling economically, are not poor. The group can be de-
fined demographically: a household at the fiftieth percentile of the Ameri-
can population in 2011 earned a little over $42,000,32 and the average Amer-
ican adult graduated from high school, attended college, but did not com-
Courts, the Law, and Father-Absence in Low-Income Families, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 551
(forthcoming 2013).
28. Both Liza Mundy and Hanna Rosin document the increasing economic autono-
my of middle-class women and the decreasing economic autonomy of middle-class men. See
LIZA MUNDY, THE RICHER SEX: How THE NEW MAJORITY OF FEMALE BREADWINNERS IS
TRANSFORMING SEX, LOVE, AND FAMILY (2012); ROSIN, supra note 25.
29. See June Carbone, Unpacking Inequality and Class: Family, Gender and the
Reconstruction of Class Barriers, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 527 (2011).
30. The top 1% stands apart from the others in terms of wealth and political influ-
ence, but for purposes of this Article, their family patterns resemble those of the elite, and we
therefore do not address them separately. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1.
31. Richard Pdrez-Pefia, Milestone Is Passed as 30 Percent of U.S. Adults Report
Having a College Degree, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2012, at AI7.
32. Catherine Rampell, Where Do You Fall on the Income Curve?, ECONOMIX (May
24, 2011, 4:10 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/where-do-you-fall-on-
the-income-curve/? r=O.
2013:11851192
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plete a four-year college degree.33 Unlike college graduates, this group has
lost ground over the last twenty years, with shrinking income distinctions
between those with some skills and those without.'
The third, and final, group consists of the poor or the marginalized.
The contemporary poverty rate hovers around 15% of Americans.35 Using
education as a measurement, the dropout rate for sixteen to twenty-four year
olds in 2010 was 7.4%, and almost 15% of the entire adult population
lacked a high school degree.36 Defining this marginalized group in terms of
economic or political marginalization, however, the group would certainly
be larger, comprising those with no ability to affect public officials.3" On the
other hand, throughout most of this Article, the marginalized group is re-
ferred to in tenBroekian terms-those receiving stigmatized government
benefits and subject to public interventions in their family life.38
Consequently, we offer a caveat on education and class: the most con-
sistently available data for purposes of charting family trends shows grow-
ing differences between groups defined in terms of education, but education
and class do not always correspond.
Finally, we note that in discussing the position of the most marginal-
ized groups, race plays a distinct role that may aggravate economic factors.
33. NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2003, at 3 tbl.A (2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-550.pdf.
34. Male high school dropouts, for example, earned only 70% in 1997 of what they
earned in 1973. Jared Bernstein & Heidi Hartmann, Defining and Characterizing the Low-
Wage Labor Market, in THE Low-WAGE LABOR MARKET: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY 15, 25 (Kelleen Kaye & Demetra Smith Nightingale eds.,
2000), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/lowwage-laborFR.pdf. White
males during the same period saw their income stagnate. Daron Acemoglu, Technical
Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 7, 15 (2002). From
1969-2012, men with only a high school diploma saw their earnings decrease "by around a
fourth. And men who didn't finish high school have fared worse still: Their incomes sank by
more than a third, leaving their inflation-adjusted earnings stranded in the 1950s." Jonathan
Rauch, The No Good, Very Bad Outlook for the Working-Class American Man, NAT'L J.
(Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/next-economy/the-no-good-very-bad-
outlook-for-the-working-class-american-man-20121205.
35. Income, Poverty and Health Insurance in the United States: 2011-Highlights,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/incpovhlth/2011 /highlights.html (last updat-
ed Sept. 12, 2012).
36. Status Dropout Rates, NAT' L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT.,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator-Coj.asp (last updated Jan. 2013); High School
Dropout Statistics, STAT. BRAIN, http://www.statisticbrain.com/high-school-dropout-
statistics/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
37. See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE NEW GILDED AGE 285 (2008).
38. See tenBroek, supra note 6, at 679-80.
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The poverty rates for African-Americans and Latinos, for example, are
more than double the rate for whites. 39
B. Family Demographics: The Elite and the Marginalized
At the time tenBroek wrote in the mid-sixties, the dual system of fami-
ly law corresponded to a dual track for families. One could speak of a
standard American family of married husband and wife, with two to three
children and a gendered division of family roles. The typical man of that era
graduated from high school but not college,4' married in his early twenties,
and was employed.4' More than 75% of wives with young children, in con-
trast, stayed home with the children.42 College-graduate women were com-
paratively rare and less likely to marry than those with only a high school
education.43
The notable exception to the conventional picture of family life came
from poor and minority families. In the mid-sixties, during roughly the same
period in which tenBroek wrote, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then a Labor
Department official, wrote an infamous report designed to call attention to
the plight of African-American families." Moynihan explained that while
divorce rates did not differ by race in 1940, by 1964 the nonwhite rate ex-
ceeded the white rate by 40%."5 Nonmarital births during the same period
grew from 16.8% to 23.6% for blacks (compared to an increase of 2% to
39. SUZANNE MACARTNEY, ALEMAYEHU BISHAW & KAYLA FONTENOT, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, POVERTY RATES FOR SELECTED DETAILED RACE AND HISPANIC GROUPS BY STATE
AND PLACE: 2007-2011, at 1 fig. 1 (2013), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr 1-1 7.pdf.
40. See CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA, 1960-
2010, at 25 (2012) (stating that only 8% of the U.S. population had graduated from college in
1963); Median Age at First Marriage, 1890-2010, INFOPLEASE,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005061.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2013).
41. In 1970, 97.6% of men with a high school education, but no college, were in the
labor force. Abraham Mosisa & Steven Hippie, Trends in Labor Force Participation in the
United States, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 2006, at 35, 49.
42. Elizabeth Waldman, Labor Force Statistics from a Family Perspective,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1983, at 16,18 tbl.2.
43. RICHARD FRY & D'VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WOMEN, MEN AND THE
NEW ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE 5 (2010), available at
http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/1 I/new-economics-of-marriage.pdf (providing marriage
data for 1970); JOSHUA R. GOLDSTEIN & CATHERINE T. KENNEY, MARRIAGE DELAYED OR
MARRIAGE FOREGONE? NEW COHORT FORECASTS OF FIRST MARRIAGE FOR U.S. WOMEN 510
(2001), available at http:llwww.asanet.orglirnages/members/docslpdflfeaturedlgoldstein.pdf
(providing marriage data for 1960 and 1970).
44. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE
CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/-mrosenfe/Moynihan%27s%20The%20Negro%2OFamily.pdf.
45. Id. at9.
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3.07% for whites).46 In addition, while middle-class African-Americans had
fewer children than well-educated whites, African-Americans with less edu-
cation had more children at younger ages than their white counterparts.
Divorce and nonmarital birth rates for whites and blacks today are
much higher than the ones Moynihan documented.48 Over the course of the
seventies, marriage rates plummeted,4 9 divorce rates rose,50 and the "baby
bust" years during that decade saw dramatic declines in fertility from the
previous decade and a steady increase in the percentage (though not the
number) nonmarital births.5 Conservatives worried about the survival of the
traditional family.52
Then, in the nineties, students of the family began to notice something
new. During this period, as inequality began to increase, the changes in the
family started to level off. The first sign was the change in divorce rates,
which were no longer increasing.
Following the liberalization of divorce laws, divorce rates had soared.
At least part of the reason was pent up demand. The shotgun marriages of
the fifties generated many of the divorces of the seventies as the children
grew up and couples, who never had much in common to begin with, grew
apart. 3 Stephanie Coontz observes that divorce rates peaked at the point
where the crest of the baby boom left home. 4 Changing gender roles con-
tributed to marital breakups.5 Women who felt trapped in unfulfilling roles
in suburbia often felt that the only way to break free was to start anew. And
with greater economic independence, women not only felt freer to leave, but
unhappy men were released from the obligation to stay with dependent
46. Id. at 7.
47. Id. at 29; STEPHANIE J. VENTURA, CHANGING PATrERNS OF NONMARITAL
CHILDBEARING IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db 18.pdf.
48. See GREGORY Acs WITH KENNETH BRASWELL, ELAINE SORENSEN & MARGERY
AUSTIN TURNER, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT REVISITED 19 (2013), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412839-The-Moynihan-Report-Revisited.pdf. For ex-
ample, the nonmarital birth rate today for whites, approximately 30%, is equal to what it was
for blacks when Moynihan wrote. Id. at 3 fig. 1.
49. St6phane Mechoulan, Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American Family,
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 148, 149 fig.5 (2006).
50. Id. at 161.
51. VENTURA, supra note 47; Mark Mather, Fact Sheet: The Decline in U.S. Fertili-
ty, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (July 2012),
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2012/world-population-data-sheet/fact-sheet-us-
population.aspx.
52. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: How OUR CULTURE HAS
WEAKENED FAMILIES 13-15 (2002).
53. STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP 167 (1992).
54. Id. at 167-68.
55. Id. at 166.
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spouses. 6 The fragility of marriage in turn persuaded more women to invest
in their careers, and economists predicted that the cycle would further de-
stabilize the family.
5 7
The more detailed studies that emerged after 2000 showed that the
overall change in divorce rates cloaked two different trends. Divorce rates
for the college educated were plummeting while those for everyone else,
after a brief hiatus, were increasing their upward climb. The following chart
captures that data:
Figure 1: First Marriages Ending in Divorce Within Ten Years as a
Percent of All First Marriages by Female Educational Attainment 8
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The striking thing about these figures is the divergence in the slope of
the curves. Starting with the couples who married in 1980, the slopes of the
curves change, with the divorce rates of the well-educated dropping sharply,
56. See id.
57. See id. For more recent analyses of the effects of no-fault divorce, concluding
that the change in the law contributed to women's greater investment in their own earning
capacity, see Betsey Stevenson, The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage-Specific Capital,
25 J. LAB. ECON. 75 (2007) [hereinafter Stevenson, The Impact of Divorce Laws]; Betsey
Stevenson, Divorce-Law Changes, Household Bargaining, and Married Women's Labor
Supply Revisited (Univ. of Pa. Scholarly Commons PSC Working Paper Series, 2007) [here-
inafter Stevenson, Divorce-Law Changes], available at
http://repository.upenn.edu/psc-working-papers/7.
58. STEVEN P. MARTIN, GROWING EVIDENCE FOR A "DIVORCE DIVIDE"? EDUCATION
AND MARITAL DISSOLUTION RATES IN THE U.S. SINCE THE 1970s, at 34 fig. 1 (2004), available
at
https://www.russellsage.org/sites/al/files/u4/Martin-Growing%2Evidence%20for%20a%2
ODivorce%2,_"'vide.pdf.
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while the divorce rates for the rest of the population decline modestly. For
those who married at the end of the eighties (examined ten years later at the
end of the nineties), the divorce rates of those without college degrees
change direction and rise significantly, while they continue to decline for
the well-educated. The net result: by 2004, the divorce rates of college
graduates were back down to what they were in 1965-before no-fault di-
vorce, the widespread availability of the pill and abortion, or the sex revolu-
tion.59 The divorce rates of the less well-educated in the meantime reached
all-time highs.
Complementing the diverging divorce rates has been the increase in
nonmarital births.6 When the age of marriage began to rise for the college
educated in the seventies, so too did the age of first birth.6 The result post-
poned family formation and lowered overall fertility.62 For high school
graduates, the big drop in marriage for those in their early twenties came in
the nineties-and it came with an increase in nonmarital births.63 Young
women who used to get pregnant and marry the father still got pregnant,
though a little bit later than they did in the fifties or seventies.' It is just that
they no longer married the father.65 The result? A steady increase in
nonmarital births, but not for everyone. The following chart shows that in
1982, the nonmarital birth rate for high school grads more closely resem-
bled that of college graduates than high school dropouts. Today, the oppo-
site is true. College graduates continue to hold the line on nonmarital births,
even as that line erodes for everyone else.
59. See Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the
Second Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 617 (2004); HYMOWITZ ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 33.
60. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT & INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE STATE OF OUR
UNIONS: MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 2010: WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS: THE NEW MIDDLE
AMERICA 23 fig.5 (W. Bradford Wilcox & Elizabeth Marquardt eds., 2010), available at
http://stateofourunions.org/2010/SOOU2010.pdf.
61. HYMOWITZ ET AL., supra note 23, at 8 fig.IIA.
62. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT & INST. FOR AM. VALUES, supra note 60, at 83 fig.8.
63. See RICHARD FRY, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE REVERSAL OF THE COLLEGE
MARRIAGE GAP 1 (2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/767-college-
marriage-gap.pdf; HyMOWlFZ ET AL., supra note 23, at 23 fig.5.
64. HYMOWITZ ET AL., supra note 23, at 8 fig.llC.
65. Id. at 10.
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Figure 2: Percentage of Births to Never Married Mothers, Ages 15-4466
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When race is taken into account, the results are even more dramatic.67
The nonmarital birth rate for white college graduates has remained at 2%,
with no change in the twenty-five-year period that started in the mid-
eighties.6" The delay in starting families produced a delay in births, but not a
lack of emphasis on marriage. Indeed, sociologist Brad Wilcox has found
that a fourteen-year-old daughter of college graduates was more likely to be
raised in a two-parent home between 2006 and 2008 than in the early eight-
ies; the same held true for African-Americans as well as whites.69
For those without college degrees, in contrast, a delay in marriage has
meant an increase in nonmarital births-and in those likely never to marry. °
For the most disadvantaged women, nonmarital birth rates have continued
to rise."' Today, for example, the nonmarital birth rate for African-
Americans without a high school degree is 96%.72 Marriage has all but dis-
appeared in the poorest communities.
66. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT & INST. FOR AM. VALUES, supra note 60, at 23 fig.5.
67. Id. at 56 fig.S2.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 57 fig.S3.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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C. Family Demographics: The Middle
In the middle, the group that experienced the largest increase in
nonmarital births in the period from the mid-eighties until 2008 has been
white high school graduates-a group once among the most likely to mar-
ry.73 The nonmarital birth rate for this group was 5% in 1982, just barely
higher than the rate for college graduates.74 By 2008, the rate had increased
to 34%, close to the 43% rate for white high school dropouts.75 African-
American high school graduates have also become much more likely to give
birth outside of marriage during the same period, with the percentage of
nonmarital births rising from 48% to 75%.76 Moreover, the huge, recent
expansion in the nonmarital birth rate has largely been to women in their
twenties, a group once more likely to marry before the birth of a child.77 In
other ways, the middle exhibits signs of both the elite and the marginalized.
Like the marginalized, their net incomes have fallen, but not nearly as dra-
matically.71 Moreover, mothers in the middle (regardless of whether they are
married or single parent) are more likely to work than those in the marginal-
ized group, but somewhat less likely than those in the elite group.79
The families in the middle of American society no longer buy into the
mainstream norms of the elite to the extent they once did, while they remain
sufficiently independent to evade state-imposed strictures on the conduct of
their families. The result is a new third system of families, which is just
beginning to become visible. At its core is a question of the understood
terms between men and women. The new terms-e.g., must a woman who
conceives a child with one man and raises it with a second acknowledge the
parental status of the first?-are still in doubt, with inconsistent and incom-
plete decisions across jurisdictions. Moreover, the formation of new terms,
as well as the formation of families who may not necessarily correspond to
the law, biology, or marriage, often takes place outside of both the coercive
system of the marginalized and the private agreements that formalize elite
bargains. During tenBroek's times, differences between elite expectations
and those of the center were minor; today, the elite model that underlies
family law jurisprudence bears increasingly little relationship to the family
lives of the middle.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. H-MOWTZ ET AL., supra note 23, at 19 fig. 11.
78. WILLIAMS & BousHEY, supra note 22, at 6.
79. Id. at 7 tbl.2 & fig.2.
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I. THE SYSTEMS AND THE LAW: THE NEW MARITAL SCRIPT [OR
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE LAW AND THE TRIPLE SYSTEMS]
A. The New Private System: Replacing Dependence with Interdependence
Through Divorce Law
The first system of family law, the system that governs private divorce
and support actions, has been remade. This system has adopted a new model
of marriage, reflected in decisions that dismantle explicitly gendered roles,
assume independence, and treat intertwined finances and caretaking as the
norm. Published opinions articulate the norms of the new system through
conventional divorce cases. While these norms do not describe all fami-
lies-plenty of neo-traditional marriages with full-time homemakers still
exist, for example-popular discourse reinforces them. ° Families with the
wherewithal to manage marriage, divorce, custody, and conflict recognize
the new terms of family life.
1. Dismantling the Breadwinner/Homemaker Marriage
The new marital ideal evolved together with a wholesale set of legal
changes that dismantled the gendered nature of traditional marriage.
First, the much heralded sex revolution resulted in legal guarantees for
women's reproductive autonomy. Supreme Court decisions legalized not
only abortion, but also access to contraception.8' The need to usher women
into early marriage in order to contain pregnancy dramatically weakened,
and later marriage became economically important to the creation of the
new middle-class model.82
Second, the women's movement advocated laws that guaranteed
women greater access to educational and workforce equality. 3 While the
gendered wage gap remains, particularly at the top, anti-discrimination
laws, together with the expansion of the service sector jobs women have
traditionally held, ensure women relatively greater access to education and
jobs.' The result eliminates much of the coercion that channeled young
couples into marriage and kept them there. Women have much greater abil-
80. See, e.g., Terry Martin Hekker, Paradise Lost (Domestic Division), N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 1, 2006), http://
www.nytimes.comi/2006/01/01/fashion/sundaystyles/OILOVE.html?pagewanted=all.
81. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
82. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two-INCOME
TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 7-11 (2003).
83. For a discussion of these changes, see Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Mar-
riage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721, 739-40 (2012).
84. See FRY & COHN, supra note 43, at 8.
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ity not just to make it on their own as young adults, but also to leave unhap-
py marriages with children in tow.85
The changing status of women set the stage for the third change-
wholesale family law reforms. Pressure had been building for at least a half
a century for divorce reform. Divorce mills, whether based on manufactured
proof of fault (in New York, aspiring actresses could be hired to pose with
unhappy husbands, supplying proof of adultery) or surreptitious trips to
liberal jurisdictions like Nevada, made a mockery of strict divorce laws.86
When reform finally occurred, it helped modernize family law across the
country as virtually every state liberalized the grounds for divorce between
the late 1960s and 1985 (Ronald Reagan signed the first pure no-fault stat-
ute in California in 1969)," and the last title-based property regime (Missis-
sippi) gave way in 1994.88 These changes came as women's roles within
intact marriages also changed. Legally and practically, the husband no long-
er controlled everything that happened in the home.
Beginning with the Married Women's Property Acts in the nineteenth
century, some states began a slow move towards the functional adoption of
"equitable distribution" systems.89 That is, at divorce, the courts acquired
the power to distribute the couples' assets irrespective of title, thus allowing
courts to grant dependent wives an "equitable" property settlement in addi-
tion to or instead of support.' These trends accelerated, with the implemen-
tation of no-fault divorce in the last third of the twentieth century. By 1994,
every common law state had adopted either an equitable distribution or a
marital property regime.9' In practice, if not always by black-letter law, the-
se regimes typically divide the couples' property fifty-fifty at divorce.92
85. For a discussion of bargaining over custody and support, see Paula England &
Nancy Folbre, Involving Dads: Parental Bargaining and Family Well-Being, in HANDBOOK
OF FATHER INVOLVEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 387 (Catherine S. Tamis-
LeMonda & Natasha Cabrera eds., 2002).
86. See, e.g., J. HERBIE DIFONzo, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND
LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 67-69, 88-91 (1997);
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 168-70.
87. See DONNA S. HERSHKOWITZ & DREW R. LIEBERT, CAL. STATE LEGISLATURE,
THE DIRECTION OF DIVORCE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: FROM FAULT TO NO-FAULT ... AND
BACK AGAIN? 130 (1997), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/98/04/currentstate.pdf.
88. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 927 (Miss. 1994) (en banc).
89. June Carbone, The Futility of Coherence: The ALl's Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution, Compensatory Spousal Payments, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 60-61 (2002).
90. Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: The
Standardization of Family Law When There Is No Standard Family, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV.
319, 333-34.
91. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 196. Mississippi was the last. See
Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 927.
92. Baker, supra note 90, at 334-35; see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION § 4.09 (2002) (recognizing a presumption of equal division); Marsha Garrison,
How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision
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While the courts retain discretion to consider the parties' respective contri-
butions to the marriage, most courts do not make individualized determina-
tions-they simply presume equal contributions, recognizing marriage as
"an egalitarian legal community."93 The new property regime is an interde-
pendent one.
At the same time the courts moved toward equal division of accumu-
lated property, they became less inclined to award long-term support fol-
lowing divorce.94 No-fault divorce made anachronistic the idea of alimony
as ongoing support for an "innocent" wife. Women's greater economic in-
dependence weakened the gendered claims for alimony, although it wasn't
until 1979 that the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama law that explic-
itly permitted only women to receive alimony.95 Divorce reformers sought
not just to make divorce easier, but also to "end, as far as possible, all per-
sonal and economic ties between the spouses" and encourage "both spouses
... [to] become equal and independent social and economic actors."96
If marriage presumes interdependence, the ability to leave marriage
carries with it an obligation to retain the capacity for financial independ-
ence. For example, Kristen and Derek Thomas Berger, a Michigan couple,
divorced after ten years of marriage because of Derek's affair.97 At the time
of the divorce in 2008, he made $120,000 per year, and she worked part-
time, earning $22,000 per year.98 The court awarded one year of alimony to
Kristen, who had degrees in nursing and dance," to assist in the transition
after the divorce."i At least as tellingly, the court also took into account the
wife's ability to earn substantially more than her part-time job currently
paid in determining the property and child-support awards) °' The opinion
commented that "it is unreasonable and unprincipled to place nearly 100
Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 452-58 (1996) (finding that judges stay fairly close to a fifty-
fifty division); cf Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's
Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 686 (1991) (con-
cluding that settled property divisions are much more variable than court-ordered ones).
93. Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 75, 77 (2004); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage
and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 12 (1990) (arguing that modem marriage, understood in
terms of the rational pursuit of mutual self-interest, still involves commitment to creation of
an interdependent regime, not lightly dissolved simply because emotional satisfaction does
not meet "soul-mate" expectations).
94. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 202-04.
95. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282-83 (1979).
96. LESLIE HARRIS, LEE E. TEITELBAUM & JUNE CARBONE, FAMILY LAW 389 (3d ed.
2005).
97. See Berger v. Berger, 747 N.W.2d 336, 347, 351 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).
98. Id. at 351.
99. Id. at 346, 350.
100. Id. at 355.
101. Id. at 351.
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percent of the financial responsibility for the children on defendant under
these circumstances."'" The court emphasized that the wife was the one
who chose to divorce, and she sought custody of the children. 3 The judge
added that "she has a great deal of education and is more than capable of
helping to financially support her children. She should not be treated so
differently from defendant simply because she wishes at this point to be
essentially a stay-at-home mother."'3"
The court expressed a clear expectation that caretaking did not prevent
full-time labor force participation and that both parties were expected to
contribute to the children's (and their own) financial needs. 5 And, in direct
contrast to the old fault-based system, which would have blamed the di-
vorce on the husband's affair, the court seems to punish the wife for seeking
the divorce while it rejects punishing the husband for his infidelity."
Young women with children, who initiate the majority of divorces, rely on
their husbands to their peril. 7 These couples typically have more debts than
assets, and long-term support is rare.' Today, the mothers of young chil-
dren are expected to be economically independent upon divorce, and, if they
are not so already, then "rehabilitative" alimony gives them a relatively
short time in which to do so." 9 While some courts retain the ability to award
102. Id. at 353.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 353-54.
106. Id. at 352-53.
107. See, e.g., Nehami Baum, "Separation Guilt" in Women Who Initiate Divorce, 35
CLINICAL SOC. WORK J. 47, 48 (2007) (stating that women initiate divorce at twice the rate of
men). Older women who are not currently homemakers, however, incur the least sympathy in
studies of juror attitudes. Ira Mark Ellman & Sanford L. Braver, Lay Intuitions About Family
Obligations: The Case of Alimony 28 (July 8, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1737146.
108. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 203.
109. "Although courts in most states retain discretion in matters of spousal support,
most states now regard alimony as rehabilitative and short term." Mark A. Fine & David R.
Fine, An Examination and Evaluation of Recent Changes in Divorce Laws in Five Western
Countries: The Critical Role of Values, 56 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 249, 254 (1994) (citations
omitted); see also Constance L. Shehan et al., Alimony: An Anomaly in Family Social Sci-
ence, 51 FAM. REL. 308, 310 (2002); Judith G. McMullen, Alimony: What Social Science and
Popular Culture Tell Us About Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support After Divorce, 19 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 41, 47 (2011). More recently, some states have reaffirmed the availa-
bility of long-term spousal support for women who divorce after long marriages, but the
duration of such awards varies widely and depends on the payor-spouse's income, the
court's findings about the payee's capacity for workforce participation, and the length of the
marriage. See Katharine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 49-50
(2010). The doctor who makes $400,000 per year can be expected to support a wife with four
children, two with special needs, who last worked for $15 per hour in a medical clinic. See
Martindale v. Martindale, No. W2003-00712-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 94366, at *1.4 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2005).
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support after longer marriages, it is difficult to predict in advance whether
they will do so.
The result changes marriage from a one-size-fits-all model of bread-
winner husband and homemaker wife to a more complex partnership, in
which both men and women seek partners likely to make comparable (if not
identical) contributions."' Economist St6phane Mechoulan observes that
states that abolished consideration of fault in the property distribution
showed the largest rise in marital age."' Mechoulan links the increase in age
to more careful searches and attributes the lower divorce rates to better
matches, hallmarks of the new marriage model." 2 Economists Betsey Ste-
venson and Justin Wolfers report that divorce reform is associated with a
30% decline in domestic violence and a significant drop in women's suicide
rates." 3 They further conclude that in pure no-fault states, couples are less
likely to finance their spouse's further education and women are more likely
to remain employed during marriage."4 All of these findings suggest that
family changes altered the implicit marital bargain and did so in a way that
enhanced financially independent women's negotiating power.
B. What the New Marital Script Means to the Bottom
These legal changes, though designed to assist the practical role of the
courts in overseeing divorce, give voice to expectations about ongoing mar-
riages, expectations that play out differently by class. The changes in prop-
erty division, custody, and spousal and child support all reflect women's
110. Both men and women, however, tend to prefer relationships in which the males
make at least as much money as females, and wives remain much more likely than their
husbands to cut back on outside employment. See, e.g., Daniel Schneider, Market Earnings
and Household Work: New Tests of Gender Performance Theory, 73 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
845, 845, 854 (2011) (finding that the more money a wife earns, the less housework she does
up until the point where she earns more than her husband, then she does more). Nonetheless,
both men and women place greater emphasis on a mate's earning capacity than either group
did a half century ago. See David M. Buss et al., A Half Century of Mate Preferences: The
Cultural Evolution of Values, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 491, 501 (2001); Christine R.
Schwartz, Earnings Inequality and the Changing Association Between Spouses' Earnings,
115 AM. J. Soc. 1524, 1526 (2010) (stating that as "women's labor force participation has
grown, men may have begun to compete for high-earning women just as women have tradi-
tionally competed for high-earning men"). Studies of low-income populations also find that
increases in less-educated women's earnings increase the marital prospects of those giving
birth outside of marriage. See Kristen Harknett & Arielle Kuperberg, Education, Labor Mar-
kets and the Retreat from Marriage, 90 Soc. FORCES 41, 43 (2011).
111. Mechoulan, supra note 49, at 163-64.
112. Id. at 161,164.
113. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Di-
vorce Laws and Family Distress, 121 Q.J. EcON. 267, 269 (2006).
114. Stevenson, The Impact of Divorce Laws, supra note 57, at 92-93; Stevenson,
Divorce-Law Changes, supra note 57, at 17.
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newfound autonomy and remake the gender bargain at the core of intimate
relationships. As both men and women place greater weight on their part-
ners' earning capacity," 5 but remain wary of relationships with too great a
disparity in earning power,"6 they delay marriage until they have more con-
fidence in their own and their partners' circumstances."7 For college gradu-
ates, this means greater assortative mating as the successful have become
more likely to marry similarly successful partners." 8 For the less successful,
it means greater wariness about both early marriage and marriage to a part-
ner who is not the right fit.
While this new system gives men and women greater ability to say
"no" to marriage, a particularly dramatic change for women, it also locks in
their mutual commitment to their children once they do marry, protecting
men's investments in their offspring and limiting women's ability to leave.
The new system enshrines parenthood as a mutually assumed and perma-
nent obligation that survives the adult relationship and includes not only
joint responsibilities to their children but also a duty to foster the involve-
ment of the other parent."9
The power balance is different in relationships outside of marriage.
While the legal distinction between marital and nonmarital children has
been largely dismantled, mothers retain greater responsibility for and great-
er authority over nonmarital children. As nonmarital births have become
more common, the result has been the emergence of an alternative model
that rests on contingent relationships and gatekeeper custodial parents. The
state simultaneously rejects this model, denigrating the legitimacy of single
parent families, and reinforces it as it fails to support non-custodial parents
who would like more involvement with their children. TenBroek's second
115. See Buss et al., supra note I 10, at 501.
116. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 110, at 845, 854 (finding that the more money a
wife earns, the less housework she does up until the point where she earns more than her
husband, then she does more); D. Alex Heckert, Thomas C. Nowak & Kay A. Snyder, The
Impact of Husbands' and Wives' Relative Earnings on Marital Disruption, 60 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 690, 701-02 (1998) (concluding that divorce is more likely if a wife earns 50 to 75%
of household income than if she earns either more than 75% or less than 50%); EDIN &
NELSON, supra note 27, at 94-97 (quoting men who indicate that they prefer partners of equal
status and similar incomes).
117. See Mechoulan, supra note 49, at 162.
118. Christine R. Schwartz & Robert D. Mare, Trends in Educational Assortative
Marriage from 1940 to 2003, 42 DEMOGRAPHY 621, 623 (2005).
119. See, e.g., Renaud v. Renaud, 721 A.2d 463, 468 (Vt. 1998) (conditioning the
mother's continuing custody on cooperation with repairing the father's relationship with the
child); Rita Berg, Parental Alienation Analysis, Domestic Violence, and Gender Bias in
Minnesota Courts, 29 LAW & INEQ. 5, 8, 24 (2011) (concluding that charges that one parent
is undermining the child's relationship with the other parent often involve cases of physical
or psychological abuse of the "alienating" partner and disproportionately result in custody
awards to the father).
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system occasionally intervenes in these families to impose support obliga-
tions (and sometimes to restrict custodial parents' rights), but it does little to
reinforce the bargains the parents may have made themselves or to make
such agreements more common or reliable.
In between, however, is a growing fight between mothers and fathers.
The middle remains more likely to marry-and to divorce. 120 Fathers in the
middle have greater ability to seek a role in their children's lives, and the
courts are more likely to rule in their favor. Yet, as the middle, like the bot-
tom, moves from married families to cohabitation to stepfamilies, the ques-
tion of which families count, and which parent gets to call the shots, be-
comes more complex.
1. Interdependence Versus Contingent Relationships
[He says,] "I'm not working, thems not my kids." If you're not married to the per-
son you say, "They're not yours? Hit the door then!" But if you're married to them,
you say, "Hit the door, please?" You know, you start nagging and they say, "I'm
not going nowhere.". . . You're stuck with them just like all the other people stuck
with their marriage and stuff.... I think it's best not to get married. Unless you're
pretty sure that person's going to take care of you. 121
-A divorced mother of four in Chicago.
Amber Strader, 27, was in an on-and-off relationship with a clerk at Sears a few
years ago when she found herself pregnant. A former nursing student who now
tends bar, Ms. Strader said her boyfriend was so dependent that she had to buy his
cigarettes. Marrying him never entered her mind. "It was like living with another
kid," she said. 22
-Single mother in Lorain, Ohio, 2012.
Twenty-five years ago, the wariness toward marriage that Wilson doc-
umented in the divorced mother of four living in Chicago was an outlier-
thought typical of the African-American underclass and no one else. Today,
not only do lower income people echo the same sentiments, 123 so do those
closer to the middle. Skepticism about whether marriage is a good thing has
become typical of working-class American men and women 24-although
they still want to marry, they are wary of someone who will take advantage
120. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT & INST. FOR AM. VALUES, supra note 60, at 72-73.
121. William Julius Wilson, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN POOR 103-04 (1996).
122. Jason DeParle & Sabrina Tavemise, For Women Under 30, Most Births Occur
Outside Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com2012/02/18/us/for-
women-under-30-most-births-occur-outside-marriage.html?pagewanted=all&_r=- &.
123. See, e.g., EDIN & NELSON, supra note 27; KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS,
PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE (2005).
124. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT & INST. FOR AM. VALUES, supra note 60, at 40-41
(over half of working-class Americans report that marriage has not worked out for people
they know).
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of them. The legal regulation of the family complicates things further-and
mandated sharing of assets, children, and lives can be a threat to those
whose lives are unstable and unequal.
In the meantime, the poor have all but given up on marriage, and the
middle struggles between two models: the hard-to-realize later marriages of
the upper third and the contingent single-parent relationships of the bottom
group. Andrew Cherlin observes in The Marriage-Go-Round that the dis-
tinctive characteristic of American relationships in comparison with other
developed countries is "sheer movement"; children born to married Ameri-
can parents are more likely to see their parents breakup than children born
to cohabiting parents in countries like Sweden." 5 He also reports that work-
ing class couples, where the husband had a blue collar job and neither
spouse graduated from college, "reported the most stressed, least happy
marriages of any group." ''"6
In the poorest communities, single-parent families are the norm.' Re-
lationships have become ever more unstable and multi-partner fertility
common.' 28 In these circumstances, a monolithic two-parent model is mean-
ingless. Instead, adult partnerships form, dissolve, and reform without any
necessary long-term relationship to the assumption of parenting roles. In a
study that included 90% of all nonmarital families in Wisconsin from 1997
to 2007, researchers found that, by the age of five, approximately half of the
children were likely to have at least one half-sibling through either their
mothers or, more likely, their fathers. 29 In these families, custodial parents,
rather than engaging in shared parenting, act as gatekeepers who trade ac-
cess to the child for need, support, and assistance.
Sociologist Linda Burton and her colleagues have studied these con-
tingent relationships among low-income women. 3 ° The women in the study
overwhelmingly bear children outside of marriage and almost all express
wariness about men.' Burton describes, for example, a woman named An-
gie, who rejected marriage out of hand, but who sought partners who could
125. ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-Go-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND
THE FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY 5, 18 (2009).
126. Id. at 169.
127. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT & INST. FOR AM. VALUES, supra note 60, at 25.
128. Sara McLanahan & Audrey N. Beck, Parental Relationships in Fragile Fami-
lies, FUTUREOFCHILD., Fall 2010, at 17, 22; EDIN & NELSON, supra note 27.
129. MARIA CANCIAN & DANIEL R. MEYER, UNIV. OF WIS.-MADISON, INST. FOR
RESEARCH ON POVERTY, THE IMPLICATIONS OF COMPLEX FAMILIES FOR POVERTY AND CHILD
SUPPORT POLICY (2012), available at
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/pubications/media/webinars/Cancian%20%20Meyer%2OWebinar%
20September%202012%20to%20post.pdf.
130. See Linda M. Burton et al., The Role of Trust in Low-Income Mothers' Intimate
Unions, 71 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1107 (2009).
131. ld. at 1 11, 1114.
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help her buy things for her house and her children, or provide care for her
elderly ailing parents. 32 She quotes Angie as observing that
"I ain't looking for that love shit," she declared. "I need a man to help me for a mi-
nute, and he's out of my house after that. You see, we got to have an understand-
ing. I get what I need, he gets what he needs, and it's a done deal. I don't need to
know nothin' about how he gets what he gets [e.g., acquiring financial resources]. I
don't want to know nothin' that particular. I'm in control. I run this shit up in
here."
133
Harvard's Kathy Edin and co-author Timothy Nelson found similar
mistrust among men of the mothers of their children."3 These relationships
are built on short-term, transactional exchanges about parenting that may or
may not ever develop into anything more permanent. The partners have
made no long-term commitment to each other, and their continued mutual
involvement with the child depends on successfully negotiating the relation-
ships with the other adult.'35 To the extent that the law intrudes into these
relationships, it tends to impose parental status on the basis of biology in
ways that may bear little relationship to the underlying parenting norms.' 36
In between the top and the marginalized is a working class in transi-
tion. Working-class conceptions take place the same way as they did in the
old days-in the context of courtships that tend to be "sexual and brief."'37
These couples may not know each other terribly well at the time of the
child's birth.'38 In another era, they would have married, and the dependent
mother would have stayed with the father so long as he brought home a
paycheck.'39 He could still go out with the boys, and she might rely more on
her relatives than her husband to care for the children, but his ties to the
family would have depended on the strength of his relationship to her."n If
he refused to marry her or if they divorced, his relationship to the child
would typically end. 4' In some parts of the country today, these couples still
marry, but those who do also divorce and remarry at high rates.4 2 In other
132. Id. atl117.
133. Id.
134. EDIN & NELSON, supra note 27, at 95-96.
135. Id. at 86, 89 (observing that parents of young children often do not know each
other well or have much in common at the time the woman becomes pregnant).
136. See Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage, supra note 16, at 612, 614.
137. George A. Akerlof, Janet L. Yellen, & Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-
Wedlock Childbearing in the United States, Ill Q.J. ECON. 277, 279 (1996). Cf Edin &
Nelson, supra note 27, at 31.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 86.
140. Id. (observing that in the fifties, sixties, and seventies, men had no relationship
with children independent of their relationship with their wives).
141. Id.
142. CHERLIN, supra note 125, at 16, 18 (finding that Americans marry and cohabit at
younger ages than other Western countries and are more likely to breakup and remarry).
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parts of the country, the couples cohabit instead and marry only if they se-
cure employment and a measure of financial stability.'43
The new relationship scripts of the upper third and the legal decisions
that give voice to the understanding that underlie them simply do not work
for much of the rest of the country. The college-educated class expects dual-
earner arrangements, and it also accepts the interdependence that accompa-
nies modern marriage. The working class has preferred more traditional and
gendered roles, but has become less likely to realize them."' Both groups
want partners who will contribute financially and emotionally.'45
The result increases the conviction of lower-income women that they
will have to look to their own earnings to support themselves and their chil-
dren. Sociologist Kathleen Gerson found that the coming generation of
young men and women overwhelmingly accept an egalitarian ideal, but both
men and women feel vulnerable."4 Women who fear being trapped in an
unhappy marriage or are afraid of being deserted by an unfaithful spouse
treat work "as essential to their survival."'47 Men worry more about meeting
the demands of the workplace and continue to see employment success as
central to their self-esteem.'48 While these attitudes have become increasing-
ly common for everyone, the level of agreement varies with race and class.
African-American women top the charts in saying that the alternative is
self-reliance; the number who opt for self-reliance over a neo-traditional
gendered role is close to 100%."' Next are the working class and poor of
any race, with 80% of this group preferring self-reliance, compared to 58%
of whites taken as a group (42% chose a neo-traditional family arrange-
ment). 50
143. McLanahan & Beck, supra note 128, at 25 (finding a strong positive link be-
tween fathers' employment and earnings and relationship quality and stability).
144. See PAUL AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER: How MARRIAGE IN AMERICA IS
CHANGING 26 (2007) (discussing marital distress among working-class couples unable to
achieve the traditional model).
145. See, e.g., EDIN & NELSON, supra note 27, at 95 (observing that low-income men
"avoid attachments to women who hold the expectation that the man will be the sole provid-
er").
146. See KATHLEEN GERSON, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: HOW A NEW
GENERATION Is RESHAPING FAMILY, WORK, AND GENDER IN AMERICA 11-12 (2010).
147. Id. at ll.
148. See id. at 166.
149. Id. at 128.
150. Id. at 127 figs.6.1 & 6.2. Gerson's findings appear to differ from Amato's con-
clusion that working-class women would prefer more traditional roles, but in fact the two
findings can be reconciled. First, Gerson is looking at young couples while Amato focused
on a data set from 2000 that included many older couples. Second, Gerson is describing
expectations about the future among couples who overwhelmingly do not yet have children.
Amato in contrast is describing tensions among married couples, who are more likely to have
children. Third, Amato's findings reflect the fact that working-class women are frequently
trapped in unsatisfying family-unfriendly jobs, when they would prefer to spend more time
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Consider what would happen to Bethenny and Calvin, a young couple
with a child in Virginia Beach, if they married and divorced. 5' In The End
of Men, author Hanna Rosin described how Calvin talked about the jobs he
once had and then lost and the ones he was trying to get.'52 Rosin's conclu-
sion was that what Bethenny said she wanted was a traditional model of
marriage, but that she recognized:
Calvin was not going to drive up in a Chevy and take his rightful place at the head
of the table one day soon, because Bethenny was already occupying that space, not
to mention making the monthly payments on the mortgage, the kitchen renovation,
and her own used car. Bethenny was doing too much but she was making it work,
and she had her freedom. Why would she want to give all that up?
153
If their lives continued along the paths they were on at the time of the
interview, Bethenny would be the primary wage-earner and the primary
caretaker. Calvin might provide her with some much needed help with their
daughter, and he could contribute financially, if not always reliably. Yet,
Calvin could neither assume the "head of the family" role nor was he likely
to settle into a subordinate one. If they split, Bethenny could reasonably
expect that the courts would equally divide the house, the car, and the bank
accounts acquired during the marriage, even if Bethenny had been making
the monthly payments on the house, paid for the car out of her earnings, and
had put aside the savings for the child's education. The property that comes
out of her earnings is "marital," and the courts do not itemize the parties'
respective contributions, but instead characterize whatever is acquired dur-
ing the marriage as a jointly owned total."
In addition, in a changing sign of the times, Calvin might claim joint
custody of the child and, if Bethenny continued to earn more than he did,
spousal or child support.'55 The very threat of an alimony claim might per-
suade her to settle the property or custody claims, and the very thought may
be enough to persuade her not to marry in the first place.'56 No surprise that
with their children, while Gerson's questions focus more on the ability to depend on a part-
ner's income.
151. See ROSIN, supra note 25, at 3-4.
152. Id. at 3-4, 261-63.
153. Id. at 3-4.
154. See Baker, supra note 90, at 333-34.
155. Alimony awards generally, however, remain rare, awarded in less than 15% of
all divorces. See Jonathan Zimmerman, Alimony Alyth Persists in New Jersey's Divorce-
Reform Drive, PHILLY.COM (June 5, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-06-
05/news/32056763_Ialimony-divorce-reform-women.
156.
[S]ome litigators find that their female clients had no idea what was ahead when
they chose to support their husbands financially and emotionally through most of
the marriage out of a sense of obligation and kindness. The idea that they would
[be] asked to continue to do so after the dissolution never occurred to them.
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Bethenny is not holding her breath in anticipation of a romantic marriage
proposal from a man who cannot hold his own in either a financial or a nur-
turing role.
C. What the New Marital Script Means to the Middle
In tenBroek's system, the middle of American society did not enjoy
the same ability as elites to hire lawyers, negotiate settlements, or determine
family life on terms of their choosing. But they did share the same assump-
tions about what reputable families meant. They married before they gave
birth, generally stayed married, and expected husbands to pay support in the
event of divorce.
With the divergence of the family patterns of the middle of the Ameri-
can family spectrum, the middle no longer shares the same family life pat-
terns that underlie the norms and family law of the elite. Today, the middle
of American society lives different lives, with more frequent divorces and
nonmarital births, than the elite. These unmarried relationships often rest on
different assumptions that may not include either sharing or interdepend-
ence. A majority of those who do not graduate from college now give birth
outside of marriage and manage family relationships in terms of contingent,
rather than integrated, relationships.'57
Second, this group, which is much less likely than the poor to receive
stigmatized public benefits, is not subject to the public system tenBroek
described. At the same time, however, it enjoys less access to lawyers and
less ability to forge legal agreements on terms of its choosing. In tenBroek's
time, of course, blue-collar families would also have had less access to legal
counsel and formalized agreements than wealthier families. Yet, if such
families ended up in court, they would have at least faced judges applying
familiar legal principals. In contrast, today's working-class families enjoy
their greatest autonomy by staying out of court.
Finally, in terms of the substance of family law, the new mainstream
system balances men's continuing greater wealth, which is subject to divi-
sion at divorce, with fathers' greater ability to secure shared parenting, lim-
iting women's ability to end family unions on terms of their choosing. The
result effects a new gender balance designed to preserve family stability.
For the rest of society, however, the system privileges state interests in re-
couping child support payments that fill state coffers in ways that distort the
gender balance between gatekeeper custodial parents (overwhelmingly
Lenore Skomal, Woman Who Pay Alimony: It's More Frequent than You Think, DIVORCE360,
http://www.divorce360.com/divorce-articles/alimony/information/women-paying-
alimony.aspx?artid=1065&page=2 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
157. HYMOWITZ ET AL., supra note 23, at 19, 26-29.
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moms) and non-custodial parents who would like to maintain a relationship
with their children.
The result is something the sociologists have labeled "deinstitutionali-
zation"'58 and which we have argued elsewhere takes family law "out of the
channel and into the swamp."'' 59 These changes accord the greatest defer-
ence to family autonomy when couples evade the legal system by refusing
to marry, failing to establish paternity, declining to seek formal orders of
support, and managing contact with children (or severing parental ties alto-
gether) through non-legal mechanisms that leave the status of parental rela-
tionships in limbo. The results may aggravate children's feelings of aban-
donment by absent parents who, in turn, may rightly feel deprived of a rela-
tionship to which they were entitled; confuse parents' understandings of the
respective family obligations they owe to each other; and leave many adults
angry at another parent whose demands may not correspond to the obliga-
tions they thought they assumed.
This third system of family law operates in the shadows of the law and
it is time to bring it to light.
III. THE SYSTEMS AND THE LAW: THE NEW PARENTHOOD SCRIPT
The law has its greatest impact when it articulates expectations about
behavior that reinforce evolving norms."6 For married college graduates,
this has involved the relatively subtle readjustment of incentives that en-
courage unions between men with reliable incomes and women who earn a
bit less, with a joint commitment to the children. 6' The legal images we
have described, which punish both dependent women and women who re-
fuse to encourage the relationships between their husbands and their chil-
dren, lock in the terms of the new marital regime. 62
A. Law, Parental Bargains, and Shared Custody-for the Elite
If the elimination of fault and the increase in women's financial inde-
pendence strengthened women's negotiating power at divorce, the counter-
158. Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 848, 848 (2004).
159. June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp: How Family Law Fails
in a New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 859 (2011).
160. See Schneider, supra note 12, at 509. Schneider, in describing family law's
efforts to create a sense of commonality, emphasized that the law has little ability to compel
parents to stay together or to eliminate conflict between warring adults. Id. at 511.
161. See discussion supra Section Il.B.
162. S&e A; cussion supra Section Hl.B.
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balance for men in the elite has come from shared parenting.'63 In some
ways, the most dramatic change in family law has been the transition from a
legal presumption that mothers should receive custody of children of tender
years to a preference for the continued involvement of both parents. M A
high percentage of the public also agrees that fathers should play more of a
role in their children's lives. Indeed, a decade ago, when Massachusetts put
a proposition on the ballot mandating shared custody, it passed by a vote of
530,716 to 97,21 1.165
This makes child support the most important financial division to oc-
cur in modem divorce. Had the maternal presumption remained in place, a
young woman would be able to leave her husband with the children in tow
and command generous support through the children's age of majority." 6
We have written elsewhere that this dynamic has made custody battles
"[g]round [z]ero in the [g]ender [w]ars.' '1 6 7
The easiest way for an ex-husband to lower child-support awards was
to seek a greater share of the children's time. 68 And just as more egalitarian
gender rules justified the "clean break" at divorce, so too did they justify
increased emphasis on shared parenting. 69 Joint custody, which many courts
163. See Carbone, supra note 89, at 75 (explaining that the two parties that cause
concern in initiating divorce are older, well-off men and younger women with children who
leave "good enough" marriages).
164. See Theresa Glennon, Still Partners? Examining the Consequences of Post-
Dissolution Parenting, 41 FAM. L.Q. 105, 105 (2007).
165. Results of Local, Regional Ballot Questions, BOSTON.coM NEWS,
http://www.boston.com/news/special/politics/2004-results/general-election/questions-al-by
_town.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). The proposition stated:
Shall the state representative from this district be instructed to vote in favor of
legislation requiring that in all separation and divorce proceedings involving minor
children, the court shall uphold the fundamental rights of both parents to the shared
physical and legal custody of their children and the children's right to maximize
their time with each parent, so far as is practical, unless one parent is found unfit or
the parents agree otherwise, subject to the requirements of existing child support
and abuse prevention laws?
SEC'Y OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., STATE ELECTION 2004 BALLOT QUESTIONS 10
(2004), available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/elepdf/balques04.pdf.
166. See McMullen, supra note 109, at 4344, 55 (discussing women's feelings of
guilt about initiating divorce as factor in lack of alimony awards); see also JUDITH S.
WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS
COPE WITH DIVORCE 23 (1980) (asserting that the party initiating divorce is likely to ask for
less financial support).
167. JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN
FAMILY LAW 180 (2000).
168. See Carbone, supra note 89, at 75.
169. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Does Parental Autonomy Require Equal Custody
at Divorce?, 65 LA. L. REV. 1345, 1367-68 (2005) (finding a decrease in child support after
statutory changes in custody provisions took effect); Margaret F. Brinig, Penalty Defaults in
Family Law: The Case of Child Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 806 (2006) [hereinafter
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initially greeted with some hostility, has become increasingly accepted in
almost all states, and many jurisdictions have adopted "friendly parent"
provisions that support the award of custody to the parent who will best
facilitate the continuing involvement of the other parent.17° Indeed, fathers'
rights groups have pressed for a presumption in favor of an equal division of
the child's time in all divorces.' Joint custody has won widespread public
support.' In two innovative studies discussed in a 2011 article, the partici-
pants strongly preferred joint custody, irrespective of the existence of con-
flict between the parents during the divorce.'73 Study participants expressed
significant reservations only when one of the parents had instigated the con-
flict.174
Joint-custody provisions effectively give greater weight to the contin-
ued involvement of both parents than to consideration of the reasons for the
breakup, the strength of the child's bond with each parent, or the compara-
tive ability of each parent to provide for the needs of the child. Law profes-
sor Martha Fineman has devoted more than one volume to the change in the
law that has weakened women's bargaining position at divorce, particularly
through the change from a maternal presumption to more facially neutral
rules.'75 While women are more likely to file for divorce than men, they are
comparatively less likely to do so if they are unsure they will secure custody
of the children.'76 Shared custody can accordingly become a divorce deter-
Brinig, Penalty Defaults] (noting that there was an increase in joint custody where couples
separated after the statute took effect).
170. HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE, supra note 96, at 692.
171. For discussion of these movements and the objections to them, see Brinig, Pen-
alty Defaults, supra note 169, at 780-81.
172. Sanford L. Braver et al., Lay Judgments About Child Custody After Divorce, 17
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 212 (2011); see also Linda Nielsen, Shared Parenting After Di-
vorce: A Review of Shared Residential Parenting Research, 52 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE
586, 587 (2011); Results of Local, Regional Ballot Questions, supra note 165 (detailing a
proposition in favor of shared parenting passed overwhelmingly).
173. Braver et al., supra note 172, at 227, 231.
174. Id. at 236.
175. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC
AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 79-95 (1991); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 82-
83 (1995). Much earlier, of course, Mnookin and Komhauser also observed that any change
to gender-neutral custody rules would weaken women's bargaining power at divorce. See
Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 8, at 978.
176. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, "These Boots Are Made for Walking":
Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126, 128 tbl. 1, 136-37 (2000)
(stating that approximately two-thirds of those filing for divorce are women and that custody
laws affect willingness to file).
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rent, and there is broad support in states in favor of the continued involve-
ment of both parents following divorce.'77
In accordance with the new legal doctrines, fathers have fought for in-
creasing shares of the children's time both because engaged husbands want
the continuing contact and because, with mandatory child-support formulas,
the easiest way for a higher-earning parent to lower child-support awards is
to seek more time with the child.'78 Just as the disappearance of long-term
spousal support has reinforced the emphasis on dual incomes, the emphasis
on shared custody has encouraged male participation in child-rearing-for
those men with access to the child.
B. Parenthood Scripts for the Marginalized
Public welfare serves as the backdrop for the parenthood scripts for
the poor. At the time ten Broek wrote of a "dual system" of family law,
those caught up in the public welfare system were single mothers, whether
because of divorce, separation, widowhood, or an unmarried birth, who
sought support from the expanded welfare state of the sixties. One of the
last of the New Deal programs to pass, AFDC was based on programs orig-
inally designed to aid widows and their children.'79 It was premised on the
notion that a single mother could not be expected to care for her children
and work outside the home. 8° "Morals" restrictions imposed by the states
limited it to the "deserving" poor (unmarried mothers need not apply) and
included criteria making those who worked in agricultural or domestic ser-
vice ineligible, disproportionately excluding African-Americans. 8'
During the sixties, various AFDC restrictions disappeared. The Su-
preme Court struck down the "man-in-the-house" rules, which considered
177. See, e.g., DOUGLAS ABRAMS, NAOMI R. CAHN, CATHERINE J. Ross & DAVID D.
MEYER, CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 743 (3d ed. 2012).
178. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 767.41(2) (2012) (establishing that joint legal custody is
presumed); id. § 767.41(4) (noting that the court "shall set a placement schedule that allows
the child to have regularly occurring, meaningful periods of physical placement" and "max-
imize[] the amount of time the child may spend with each parent"); see also LESLIE
BENNETTS, THE FEMININE MISTAKE: ARE WE GIVING Up Too MUCH? 110-12 (2007).
179. CARBONE, supra note 167, at 201; Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna to Proletariat:
Constructing a New Ideology of Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV. 415,
421-22 (1999).
180. It initially proposed to cover children under sixteen for whom there was "'no
adult person, other than one needed to care for the children, able to work and provide a rea-
sonable subsistence compatible with decency and health."' CARBONE, supra note 167, at 201
(quoting LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 277 (1995)).
181. See Brito, supra note 16, at 240-43; Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Re-
thinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Fami-
lies, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 617, 623 (2012).
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the income of any cohabitant available to the children, thus making their
mother ineligible for benefits. 182 The Court also upheld unannounced moni-
toring visits by caseworkers. 8 3 Racially motivated exclusions were elimi-
nated, and the percentage of AFDC recipients who were African-American
rose to 46% in 1967.8" The benefits also became more generous, making it
easier for a young mother to live on her own. While the AFDC caseload
rose relatively modestly between 1950 and 1965, after the changes, it in-
creased 125% from 1965 to 1970, increased further by 29% between 1970
and 1975, and then leveled off as Congress adopted more and more re-
strictions thereafter. 85
As a condition of the receipt of benefits, the state increasingly at-
tempted to impose order. Central to these efforts was child-support en-
forcement. In the sixties, the principal way to establish paternity was mar-
riage. If a child was born during a marriage, the husband and wife automati-
cally became legal parents and need take no action to establish
parenthood. 8 6 For a child born outside of marriage, establishing paternity
typically required a civil action. 87 With the expansion of public benefits
came an effort to hold the "real culprits" responsible: the supposedly ne'er-
do-well men who had fathered the children receiving state support and then
abandoned the mothers.'88 The system stigmatized the available benefits and
conditioned them on the mother's cooperation with the state in establishing
paternity and securing child support.'89 Driven by federal efforts to mini-
mize costs, the regulations eventually produced a much greater degree of
national standardization in paternity establishment and child support en-
forcement than in other areas of family law."
In doing so, the system imposed mainstream norms on parties who ei-
ther may not share these norms or cannot realize them when they do share
182. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311-13, 316 (1968).
183. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971).
184. JAMES T. PATTERSON, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE OVER BLACK FAMILY LIFE-FROM LBJ TO OBAMA 96 (2010).
185. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980,
101ANN. ED. 166 (1994). It increased 7% in the 1950s and 24% from 1960-1965. Id.
186. See Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage, supra note 16, at 614.
187. HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE, supra note 96, at 899.
188. Jill Hasday observes, for example, that: "[firom the start, this program [ADC]
was grounded in a suspicion of fathers who had failed to support their families, on the as-
sumption that there was almost no acceptable reason for that state of affairs." Hasday, supra
note 16, at 359.
189. CARBONE, supra note 167, at 157; see also Harris, The Basis for Legal Parent-
age, supra note 16, at 614, 620-21; Brito, supra note 16, at 256-60.
190. See, e.g., Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage, supra note 16, at 614, 620-21;
Brito, supra note 16, at 256-60.
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them. 1' This system vindicates public rather than private interests and often
imposes punitive or counterproductive measures insensitive to the individu-
al circumstances of the affected parties.'92 While the family and the nature
of state support have changed since tenBroekian times, state-initiated pater-
nity and support actions continue to differ in form and purpose from private
paternity and support litigation.'93
The child support system, especially when connected to the drive to
collect money from poor dads to benefit public coffers, continues to reflect
an image of deadbeat dads abandoning their families. 94 It fails to reflect the
reality of families in the bottom third where the mother may have rejected
the father after she found someone else, with the father struggling to support
a new blended family dependent on his contributions.'95 It most certainly
does not reflect fathers "doing the best [they] can," caught in between the
women's demands that they provide more and an employment system un-
forgiving of criminal convictions (major or minor), limited skills, and fami-
ly needs.'96
191. The literature displays many misunderstandings on this point because most
groups share the same aspirations, but not necessarily the same assumptions, about the steps
necessary to realize the aspirations. Both middle-class and poor couples believe, for example,
that fathers should contribute to their children. Custodial parents who divorce, however, may
believe that court orders, coupled with custody schedules and paycheck deductions, give
them greater security, while poor parents, whose partners may have less reliable income, may
prefer to trade off support and access to the child as circumstances change. For example,
Mnookin and Komhauser, observed that:
[i]f a father who values visitation fails to make support payments, then, quite apart
from the mother's ability to enforce his promise in court (which may often be too
slow and expensive to be effective), the mother may believe that she can retaliate
by informally cutting off the father's visitation or making it more difficult. Even
though this tactic has no legal validity, it is nevertheless likely to be faster, cheap-
er, and more effective than court enforcement. Similarly, a father may believe that
his ability to cut off support will ensure that the mother will keep her word con-
cerning visitation.
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 8, at 965.
192. See, e.g., Leslie Joan Harris, Questioning Child Support Enforcement Policy for
Poor Families, 45 FAM. L.Q. 157, 165-66 (2011).
193. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 12, at 526.
194. See generally Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform,
Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325 (2005).
195. See, e.g., JUNE GIBBS BROWN, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CLIENT
COOPERATION WITH CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES TO
IMPROVEMENT 6 tbl.2 (2000), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-98-00041 .pdf.
Of the possible reasons for noncooperation, 94% of surveyed child-support caseworkers
report the mother's desire to protect the noncustodial parent and 88% report the fear of losing
informal support, with an additional 63% reporting the fear of domestic violence. Id. For the
surveyed welfare office caseworkers, the numbers are similar: 92% report the desire to pro-
tect the noncustodial parent and 88% report the fear of losing informal support, while 73%
report the fear of domestic violence. Id.
196. For a portrait of these men, see EDIN & NELSON, supra note 27.
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The Fragile Families studies provide a strong grounding for our un-
derstanding of single parenthood in the marginalized group.' 97 While in oth-
er eras unmarried mothers (particularly white mothers) typically did not
have a continuing relationship with the father, more recent studies indicate
that at the time of the child's birth, 30% of unwed parents are romantically
involved, and 50% live together. 98 Indeed, even fathers who were no longer
with the mothers tended to remain in touch with their children, with 87%
having seen their children after the birth and 63% having seen their children
more than once in the preceding month. 99 By the fifth year, 37% of children
had had no contact with their fathers in the last one to two years, 43% saw
their fathers regularly, and 20% were in between. 2' Black, non-Hispanic
men were more likely to have maintained contact with their children, to
have seen them in the past month, and to have seen them frequently.2°'
Unmarried fathers' relationships with their children occur in the con-
text of the contingent relationships they negotiate with the mothers, and
every study indicates that the father's continuing relationship with his chil-
dren depends on how he manages that relationship. In some cases, the father
will be living with the mother in a relationship that becomes more like mar-
riage with the passage of time. In most cases, however, the unmarried moth-
er and father will eventually part. In these cases, the access to the child the
mother allows often depends on the father's willingness to pay for things
the child needs, cooperate with the mother, and assist when she needs
help. °2 Mothers value fathers' contributions not solely by the amount of
support contributed, but also by non-economic factors, such as role model-
ing." Outside of the formal child custody system, men often saw their chil-
dren' s mothers as controlling access.2 4
Patterns of parental involvement among unmarried and non-resident
parents involve significant cultural divisions and vary significantly by race,
197. Sara McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, The Fragile Families and Child Well-Being
Study: Questions, Design, and a Few Preliminary Results (Inst. for Research on Poverty
Discussion, Paper No. 1208-00, 2000), available at
http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WPO0-07-FF-McLanahan.pdf.
198. Id. at41.
199. Marcia J. Carlson, Sara S. McLanahan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, Coparenting and
Nonresident Fathers' Involvement with Young Children After a Nonmarital Birth, 45
DEMOGRAPHY 461, 472-73 (2008).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See NANcY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 3 (2000); Katharine K. Baker,
Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14
CORNELL JL. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2 (2004); Harris, supra note 192, at 171.
203. See Maureen R. Waller, Viewing Low-Income Fathers' Ties to Families Through
a Cultural Lens: Insights for Research and Policy, 629 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SC.
102, 109-10(2010).
204. See EDIN & NELSON, supra note 27, at 208.
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as well as class. African-American fathers, for example, are more likely to
be involved with children with whom they don't live than fathers of other
races, and they have higher quality coparenting relationships 05 Moreover,
for whites, fathers' involvement with their children declines most if the fa-
thers remarry or take responsibility for new partners and new children,
while for Afican-Americans and Hispanics, the largest declines are associ-
ated with the mothers' new relationships. 2" These findings suggest that dif-
ferent communities have established different tradeoffs as parents balance
responsibility to multiple children in different households. The law, in con-
trast, as a formal matter draws few such distinctions. It emphasizes shared
parenting whether parents marry or not, and it often privileges first families
ahead of subsequent families."0 7 In practice, however, significant differences
exist that make the reality of working class families' interactions with the
legal system quite different from those of the better-off upper third.2'
For these couples, the second system of family law provides little of
the legal "readjustment" of the new gender bargain that has occurred for the
elite. Instead, it often increases gender distrust and undermines existing
relationships.
C. Parenthood Scripts in the Middle
For those in the middle, the system fails to frame the issue of gender
balance in ways that make it visible at the same time that the courts struggle
with a culture war over the terms of parenthood. Cherlin's description of a
"marriage-go-round" best describes the middle of American society that
marries young, divorces at rates higher than the rest of world, and then re-
marries or at least cohabits with new partners." In this world, the critical
question is who counts as a parent-the biological father who may never
have had a relationship with the child, the husband who may be a legal fa-
ther if the birth occurred within the marriage (or a lower status "stepparent"
if it did not), or the functional father, married or not, who established a rela-
tionship with the child?
205. McLanahan & Beck, supra note 128, at 27.
206. Kathryn Edin, Laura Tach & Ronald Mincy, Claiming Fatherhood: Race and
the Dynamics of Paternal Involvement Among Unmarried Men, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sc. 149, 161 (2009).
207. See, e.g., Adrienne Jennings Lockie, Multiple Families, Multiple Goals, Multiple
Failures: The Need for "Limited Equalization" as a Theory of Child Support, 32 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 109, 110-11 (2009).
208. See Daniel L. Hatcher, Don't Forget Dad: Addressing Women's Poverty by
Rethinking Forced and Outdated Child Support Policies, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y &
L. 775, 779 (2012).
209. See CHERLIN, supra note 125, at 16-18.
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The states critically disagree not only on the outcomes but also on the
images and the reasoning that attend these disputes. Texas, for example,
declared the marital presumption unconstitutional in the nineties expressly
because it "leave[s] this determination of the child's best interest and the
definition of family, itself, exclusively to the biological mother."2 ' The
court objected to a distinction that would, in effect, grant rights only to
those fathers whom the mothers had permitted to develop a relationship
with the child.21' The courts' objection to maternal choice was thus central
to the decision. California, in contrast, has reaffirmed the marital presump-
tion but then largely ignored marriage itself. Instead, California rewards the
men (and women) who have lived with the mother and child and assumed a
parental role.212 In this calculus, neither biology nor marriage counts as
much as function. The state does acknowledge, however, (though only in an
intermediate appellate opinion), that this means that the mother can effec-
tively block the biological father from assuming a parental role, thus reach-
ing the point where he acquires parental rights. 3
State by state, these cases sometimes provide guidance. Thus, Texas
holds that a woman who had a man's child owes him the opportunity to
develop a relationship with that child,14 while California concludes that a
mother has such an obligation primarily to the partner she chose to allow
into the child's life.21 5 But the effect of the Texas opinion gives women
greater incentive to lie about paternity, and no other state has followed Cali-
fornia's unqualified embrace of functional parenthood.
D. Parenthood Revisited: How the Triple System Plays Out in Custody
An elaborate, federally mandated system exists to secure child support
enforcement while fathers who would like to secure contact with their chil-
dren are left largely on their own. The result builds in procedures that make
210. In re J.W.T., No. D-1742, 1993 Tex. LEXIS 101, at *29-30 (Tex. June 30, 1993)
(depublished).
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 13, 15 (Cal. 2004) (recognizing the hus-
band, who had not lived with the mother at the time of the child's conception or birth, as a
presumed father); June Carbone, From Partners to Parents Revisited: How Will Ideas of
Partnership Influence the Emerging Definition of California Parenthood?, 7 WHI'rIER J.
CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 3, 4 (2007).
213. See, e.g., H.S. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 726 (Ct. App. 2010)
(recognizing that the statute does "allow the mother and her husband to prevent the biologi-
cal father from ever establishing parental rights over a child"); Gabriel P. v. Suedi D., 46 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 437, 439 (Ct. App. 2006) (noting that the mother, Suedi, allowed Anthony, the non-
biological father, to live with her, accompany her to the hospital, and voluntarily declare
paternity).
214. In reJ.W.T., 872 S.W.2d at 198.
215. In re Jesusa-V., 85 P.3d at 13.
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the enforcement of parental rights and obligations very different at the top,
the bottom, and the center of American society.
The legal differences start with the ease of establishing paternity. The
marital presumption establishes the spouses as the legal parents, and divorce
decrees routinely recite whether children of the marriage exist and include
orders that reflect mandatory state child-support guidelines.2 6 In this sys-
tem, marriage becomes, essentially, "a contract for trade in children which
transfers a defined share of rights to children from a woman to her husband.
As a result, men must pay for marriage in exchange for custodial rights. 217
Shared parenting is deeply embedded in modem marriages, the foundation
of the families of the upper third.
For unmarried parents, establishing paternity is more difficult and re-
quires the cooperation of both parents, although federal law encourages the
state to streamline paternity procedures.2 18 The primary means for doing so
is a "voluntary acknowledgment of paternity" (VAP) signed in the hospital
by the mother and father attesting to the man's paternal status. 19 The alter-
native is a paternity proceeding, which unlike a VAP requires access to the
courts and a relatively expensive paternity test. The Fragile Families and
other studies have found that the more closely involved with each other the
parents were prior to the birth, the more likely they were to sign a VAP and
to do so within the first month of the child's life. 220 Those fathers who sign
VAPs are more likely to pay support and stay involved in the child's life if
the mother and father part; those who do are also more likely to be em-
ployed.22'
The Wisconsin Department of Children and Families has been collect-
ing data on custody arrangements in three kinds of actions: divorce, VAPs,
and paternity adjudications. The Wisconsin study finds that shared custody,
which constitutes approximately half of the custody awards at divorce in the
state, is more common among higher-income parents, among parents whose
incomes are roughly similar, and in cases in which the father has legal rep-
resentation.222 When the parents were married, the rate of equal, shared cus-
tody was 28.3%, while it was 7.1% when the father voluntarily acknowl-
216. See EDIN & NELSON, supra note 27, at 213-14 (noting that the courts automati-
cally assign visitation when imposing child-support obligations in the context of divorce).
217. MAYA ROSSIN-SLATER, ENGAGING ABSENT FATHERS: LESSONS FROM PATERNITY
ESTABLISHMENT PROGRAMS 6 (2012), available at
http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/filemgr?&file id=7221308.
218. Harris, supra note 192, at 161,166-67.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) (2006) (setting out the requirements for VAPs).
220. Harris, supra note 192, at 168 (citing BROWN & COOK, supra note 26; Ronald
Mincy, Irwin Garfinkel & Lenna Nepomnyaschy, In-Hospital Paternity Establishment and
Father Involvement in Fragile Families, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 611 (2005)).
221. Id. at 169-70 & n.69.
222. BROWN & COOK, supra note 26, at 28-29.
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edged paternity and 4.2% when paternity had to be adjudicated.223 The study
found that in 2006 and 2007, shared placement ranged from 10% of the
cases in which the family's income was under $25,000 a year or less to over
47% of the cases reporting family income over $150,000 per year. 4 The
study, which looked only at court data, did not indicate whether the results
reflected the parties' preferences, the incentive for higher-income parents to
seek more of the child's time, wealthier fathers' greater access to legal rep-
resentation, or all of the above. In contrast, shared custody in paternity ad-
judications-where actions are generally brought against a nonmarital par-
ent and which typically do not occur among the elite-remains rare.2
These figures suggest that even though shared parenting is the domi-
nant legal norm, the system readily facilitates the ability of the middle class
to effect the kind of trade Mnookin and Kornhauser described as an ex-
change of more time with the child in exchange for less support.226 In con-
trast, unmarried men have greater difficulty gaining access to formal custo-
dy orders, both because of the obstacles to establishing paternity and of us-
ing the legal system more generally. They are accordingly far more depend-
ent on the relationship with the mother for access to the child, while subject
to the dictates of the state when it comes to enforcement. Edin and Nelson
observe that "[i]n a startling reversal of the way gender typically operates in
American society, unwed childbearing seems to offer mom, and not dad, all
the power: 'it's her way or the highway,' in the words of one father. 227
Yet, the legal system does not necessarily recognize the terms of such
relationships. While the emphasis on shared custody facilitates the informal
trade of time for less support, the second system of family law does not rec-
ognize the informal support non-custodial fathers often provide. And the
middle is developing less formal bargains of its own.
E. Parenthood Revisited: How the Triple System Plays Out in Child
Support
The formal system that governs the upper third has made dual parent-
ing more common. The welfare system that imposes support obligations
has, ironically, interfered with fathers' involvement with their children. In
between is an informal system that ratifies parental bargains only when they
remain veiled from public view.
223. Id. at 18-23.
224. Id. at 19.
225. Id. at 20.
226. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 8, at 964.
227. EDIN& NELSON, supra note 27, at 214.
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Law professor Kathy Baker argues that recognition of paternity in-
volves contractual understandings between mother and father. 8 Men tend
to support "the one they're with" and provide the most support to the wom-
en and their children with whom the men have an on-going relationship. 229
Women, in turn, encourage the greater involvement of the men who con-
tribute to their children, either financially or otherwise, and often form new
relationships when the father does not remain involved.23°
The formal system of child-support enforcement interferes with these
ongoing bargains.2 1 VAPs make child-support collection easier, privatizing
dependence through public-law-imposed procedures that are oblivious to
the actual arrangements that couples make for custody and support. The
Fragile Families studies found that 24% of non-resident fathers paid formal
cash support, whereas 35% paid cash informally, and 44% provided in-kind
support.232 Moreover, the dollar value of the informal support was worth
more than the formal support.233 Yet, almost no fathers (6%) paid both.2 4
The mothers accordingly preferred the informal support, which tended to be
greater in value, to go directly to the child, and which could be tailored to
what the father could afford and when he was able to contribute.235 These
informal contributions were more common among couples who had sepa-
rated recently, and tended to diminish over time.236 Insistence on formal
child-support enforcement, on the other hand, tended to alienate the fa-
thers. 237 They often became angry at the mothers, and they became less like-
ly to see the mothers or contribute informally to the children. 238 Leslie Har-
ris concludes that while formal orders increased support from fathers who
would otherwise not have contact with their children, they were counterpro-
228. See generally Baker, supra note 202.
229. Id. at 36-37.
230. Id.; see also CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1. Men are also more likely to estab-
lish paternity if they have a close relationship with the mother. See Mincy, Garfinkel &
Nepomnyaschy, supra note 220, at 615. A smaller Wisconsin study found that almost half of
the unmarried parents in the state filed VAPs within a few months of birth for children born
in 2005. BROWN & COOK, supra note 220, at 13-14. The mothers were more likely to use
VAPs if they were older or college educated and less likely to do so if the mother was receiv-
ing public support. Id. at 16, 27.
231. Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage, supra note 16, at 631-33.
232. LENNA NEPOMNYASCHY & IRWIN GARFINKEL, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
AND FATHERS' CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEIR NONMARITAL CHILDREN 19-20 (rev. ed. 2007),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3060035/.
233. See Harris, supra note 192, at 164.
234. NEPOMNYASCHY & GARFINKEL, supra note 232, at 19-20.
235. Id. at 10; see also TIMOTHY S. GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL
MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2009, at 7-8 (2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/201 lpubs/p60-240.pdf.
236. Harris, supra note 192, at 165.
237. Id. at 171.
238. Id.
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ductive for the larger group of dads who did have a continuing relationship
with their children.239
Couples in the middle, who are neither on welfare nor likely to benefit
significantly from child support, often prefer different types of arrange-
ments. The custodial parents benefit less from formal orders. The 2009 cen-
sus data, for example, indicates that divorced custodial parents are signifi-
cantly more likely to have support orders than unmarried custodial parents
(many of whom may have been compelled to seek a formal order because of
their receipt of public benefits).' ° Moreover, divorced custodial parents are
wealthier and are more likely to receive the child support when it is or-
dered. 4 Of divorced custodial parents due child support, 43% received all
of the child support payments due and 25% received nothing, while for
comparable custodial parents who had never been married, 34% received all
payments and 34% received none.242
Bargains that deviate from state-mandated guidelines are difficult, and
courts will not often support a trade of in-kind support for access to the
child or a termination of the other parent's involvement and support, even
among the elite. Michael Jackson could not persuade to the courts to accept
his agreement with his ex-wife, Debbie Rowe, for example, to terminate
Rowe's parental status in exchange for a release in responsibility for sup-
port.243 On the other hand, for those couples not on welfare, if the custodial
parent does not seek support, no one is likely to notice.
Census data from 2009 provides a detailed look at the reasons custodi-
al parents do not seek child support orders, and they correspond to the in-
formal bargains that characterize much of the middle of American socie-
ties.'4 Those without such orders listed as reasons, in the following order:
Other parent provides what he or she can 34.4%
Did not feel need to make legal 32.1%
Other parent could not afford to pay 29.2%
Did not want other parent to pay 21.1%
239. Id.
240. GRALL, supra note 235, at 6 tbl.2.
241. On wealth, see WENDY WANG, KIM PARKER & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW RESEARCH
CTR., BREADWINNER MOMS: MOTHERS ARE THE SOLE OR PRIMARY PROVIDER IN FOUR-IN-TEN
HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN; PUBLIC CONFLICTED ABOUT THE GROWING TREND 19 (2013),
available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/05/Breadwinnermoms-final.pdf. On
child-support collection, see Philip N. Cohen, Child Support Glass Nearly Half Full, FAM.
INEQUALITY (Nov. 9, 2009, 10:55 PM),
https://familyinequality.wordpress.coml2009/11/09/child-support-glass-nearly-half-full/;
GRALL, supra note 235, at 6 tbl.2.
242. GRALL, supra note 235, at 6 tbl.2.
243. In re Marriage of Jackson, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365 (Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
244. GRALL, supra note 235, at 7 fig.3.
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Child stays with other parent part of the time 17.7%
Could not locate other parent 16.8%
Did not want to have contact with other parent 16.7%245
These results describe a number of different types of relationships. In
the cases where the custodial parent reports that the other parent "provides
what he or she can," "[d]id not feel need to make it legal," or the "[c]hild
stays with other parent part of the time," the parents may have an ongoing
relationship of some kind and have worked out support on a cooperative
basis. Where the parents do not want contact with the other parent or could
not locate the other parent, on the other hand, the relationship may have
broken down, and the parents may have decided they do not want further
involvement with each other.
Consider, for example, the likely denouement of the relationship be-
tween Bristol Palin (the daughter of former vice-presidential candidate and
Alaska governor Sarah Palin), who became pregnant at seventeen, and her
high school sweetheart, Levi Johnston, who continue to replay their con-
tinuing conflicts over the blogosphere. While the celebrity of Bristol's
mother put the family in an elite class of its own, high school dropouts Levi
and Bristol are more typically the struggling middle of the American spec-
trum. When their relationship broke down not long after the birth of their
son, Tripp, Bristol (who had not yet appeared on Dancing with the Stars)
struggled to provide for their son on her own and sued Levi for support.4
Levi responded by seeking custody.247 The litigation became intense, with
the parties exchanging charges in the press as well as in court and including
attacks on other family members. Levi's contact with the child increased
after he and Bristol reconciled; they went back to fighting after Bristol dis-
covered that Levi had fathered another child. Online tabloids reported (con-
firmed by Bristol's attorney) that Levi was delinquent in child support and
owed tens of thousands in back payments. 48 He also rarely sees his son.249
We frequently see such disputes end with the mother's decision to give up
on collecting support in exchange for never having to deal with the father
again, and the father's acceptance of the implicit bargain as a good one.
245. Id. Additional reasons listed include: "did not legally establish paternity"
(9.3%), "other reasons" (6.1%), and "child was too old" (.5%).
246. Bristol Palin-Levi Johnston's a Deadbeat Dad, TMZ (Apr. 7, 2012, 6:00 AM),
http://www.tmz.com/201 2/04/07/bristol-palin-levi-johnston-child-support/.
247. Michael Y. Park, Levi Johnston to Sue for Joint Custody of Son Tripp, PEOPLE
(Nov. 9, 2009, 1:10 PM), http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20318502,00.html.
248. Bristol Palin-Levi Johnston's a Deadbeat Dad, supra note 246.
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The legal insistence on two parents and the preference for shared par-
enting applies in theory to everyone, married or single, wealthy or poor. In
fact, the interaction of the legal preferences with couples' parenting ar-
rangements varies considerably. For those with the resources to litigate-
and to have their paychecks subject to withholding for support-it ups the
stakes underlying parental disputes. For those who marry only after a
lengthy search, it reinforces an interdependent marital ideal and a norm of
continued two-parent involvement after a breakup. For those who marry
hastily, at too young an age or because of an unplanned pregnancy, it
changes the dynamic at divorce. These marriages are most likely to end
because of the mothers' dissatisfaction. Historically, young women stayed
in these unhappy relationships because of financial dependence; today, the
threat of shared custody is the remaining factor counseling hesitation."'
When such couples divorce, the most likely result is either a father who
seeks equal custody to reduce child support obligations or an informal
agreement to forego support in exchange for less contact with the child. We
suspect that the choice between the two reflects the father's resources, both
in the absolute and in comparison with the mother.
This latter dynamic frames the choices for the unmarried as well. They
differ, however, in two respects. First, for the mother, paternity becomes a
lot like marriage. If the mother does not trust the father, or if she fears a
state takeover of the terms of their relationship, she may prefer to avoid
formal legal ties. Signing a VAP makes it harder to change your mind about
a parental partner. Nonetheless, if the mother and father are together, they
may welcome public acknowledgement of their relationship to the child,
which also establishes the foundation for later support and custody orders.
Mothers like Bristol often initiate support actions because of anger at un-
faithful fathers or frustration with their failure to provide support voluntari-
ly. Fathers may want recognition of their status to protect their investment
in a relationship with the child from a vengeful, unfaithful, or erratic moth-
er. VAPs provide an intermediate status for parents who are likely, sooner
or later, to parent apart. Second, for those families who need public assis-
tance, it also means that the state, rather than the parties, is likely to initiate
child-support actions. At a symbolic level, these actions reinforce the dual
parenting model, but they do so in a way that renders invisible and system-
atically undermines the informal exchanges that sustain non-custodial par-
ents' continuing involvement with their children."'
250. See Brinig & Allen, supra note 176, at 136-37.
251. See Kohn, supra note 27; see also Debra A. Madden-Derdich & Stacie A. Leon-
ard, Parental Role Identity and Fathers' Involvement in Coparental Interaction After Di-
vorce: Fathers' Perspectives, 49 FAM. REL. 311, 313 (2000) (describing mothers' roles in
encouraging or undermining father involvement).
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These disparities reinforce a triple system of family law. Couples who
bear children together or adopt within marriage enjoy an unequivocal em-
brace of shared parenting at the national level. Couples caught in the state
aid/child-support enforcement system that denigrates absent fathers remain
subject to societal disapproval at odds with their own understandings of the
terms of the relationships. Families in the middle, who are more likely than
the elite to marry young, separate, remarry, cohabit, and raise children with
multiple partners, are in limbo, with legal opinions that neither embrace nor
repudiate their relationships and only rarely illuminate the evolving norms
that govern their behavior.
At the core of these divisions is a growing class-based disparity in
family behavior, which the law both reflects and reinforces. Parental in-
vestment in children has increased considerably, and it has done so for both
men and women. 2 These figures, however, differ significantly by class. In
the seventies, college-graduate parents and those who didn't graduate from
college spent about the same amount of time per day with their children. 53
Today, however, college-graduate parents spend several hours more a week
with their children than those without college degrees."' The gulf is particu-
larly great for men, with college-graduate fathers spending almost double
the amount of time with their children as high school graduate or high
school dropout parents."' Even separating married and unmarried fathers,
the time studies indicate that better-educated men have embraced a dual
parenting norm to a greater degree than less-educated men, in part because
of the fragility of working-class relationships.1 6
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, legal developments contribute to the class divide in family
life. In turn, the class divide affects the law: The interaction between law
and behavior is iterative,257 with courts choosing which behavioral changes
to embrace (those of the elite), which to reject (those of the marginalized),
252. RosIN, supra note 25, at 69-70.
253. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, CARL B. FREDERICK & KAISA SNELLMAN, GROWING
CLASS GAPS IN SOCIAL CONNECTEDNESS AMONG AMERICAN YOUTH 13 fig.5 (2012), available
at
http://academia.edu/1625348/Growing-Class-Gaps-in-So-cial Connectedness-amongAm
ericanYouth.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. McLanahan, supra note 59, at 617; EDIN & NELSON, supra note 27, at 167, 208
(explaining that while fathers' relationships with their children now depend less on the
strength of the relationship with the mother, the mother still plays a gatekeeping role that
determines access).
257. See supra note 1.
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or which to ignore (the middle). The law effectively channels the elite into
the institutions of marriage and parenthood by reinforcing a new gender
bargain, one that gives the parties room to negotiate arrangements that adapt
the laws to their needs. For the top, the rule is get married, stay married, and
if you do not, then negotiate parenthood either to sever the other progeni-
tor's parental ties or to lock in shared financial and custodial arrangements.
Public welfare law insists on upholding mainstream norms as a condi-
tion of public benefits, even when the effort is counterproductive. It contin-
ues to proceed from the premise that poor men have "abandoned" their chil-
dren in an era when it is more likely that the mothers have given up or
walked out on the fathers. The law accordingly refuses to recognize the con-
tributions marginalized fathers make and to insist on measures that make
dual-parental contributions less likely at the same time that the law refuses
to ratify the responsibility poor women have assumed for their children. At
the bottom, interdependent finances make marriage a bad bargain absent
shared contributions and financial stability. And outside of marriage, men
face more hurdles establishing paternity and securing access to the child
even if their parenthood is not in doubt. For these women, the best strategy
is not to marry, not to allow a man to acknowledge paternity voluntarily,
and to be wary about any long-term relationship with a man who cannot pull
his own weight. The result is the continuation of a second system that gives
lip service to mainstream norms, as it heavy handedly applies them to a
group unable to realize them.
In the middle, women try to choose functional second parents, rather
than spouses or biological parents, for their children, and they seek financial
independence from their partners. The law, which seeks to reaffirm male
authority, has dealt warily and uneasily with women's greater ability to
evade the system altogether. For this group, the law no longer expresses
shared norms, in part because family norms are in fact less-widely shared,
in part because the middle can no longer realize elite norms and in part be-
cause the courts have dealt with greater family diversity by substituting
more formulaic decisions that fail to grapple with underlying normative
disputes."8 This normative disengagement leaves the middle, which is not
subject to the second system's punitive interventions, free to ignore the law
altogether.
At the core of these family law developments are different allocations
of power to the three different groups. First, at the top, men with resources
are more likely than other men to marry to marry a woman who earns less
than they do and to seek a larger share of the child's time at divorce. The
formal system of family law protects their investment in their children. Se-
cond, in the middle, for women who do not enjoy the opportunity to marry a
258. See --a!,---, supra note 90, at 320.
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man with resources, a reliable income, or dependable behavior, not marry-
ing may be the better course. These women retain greater power over their
families, whether intact or not, if they do not legally commit to the men in
their lives. For the unmarried, the onus is on the father to establish paternity,
seek a custody order and enforce it if the mother does not cooperate-
barriers that may be well beyond those without access to lawyers. This new
system of family law accords unmarried women greater power in the family
by looking other way. Third and finally, those who receive public benefits
remain largely powerless. Neither the men nor the women control the legal
terms of their relationships as the state imposes terms that may not reflect
either the adults' private bargains or the children's' interests. This system
reserves the greatest power for the state.
For the future, we hope the law adapts to the changing structure of the
American family, recognizing the multiple ways that fathers can support
children without direct financial contributions, acknowledging the depend-
ence and interdependence that marriage creates, and recognizing the signifi-
cance of the primary caretaker. Fundamentally, this requires recognizing
and respecting women's increasing autonomy. Our social understandings
and law are still somewhat in flux on these issues, our social scripts still are
not completely settled, and instead of playing a divisive and coercive role,
the law should play a supportive role.
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